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Abstract. An assessment is made of the radioactive contamination
of Danish territory in the event of a core-melt accident at the
Barseback nuclear power plant in Sweden.
Accidents including both core melt-down and containment failure
are considered. Consequences are calculated for a BWR-3 release
under common meteorological conditions and for a BWR-2 release
under extreme meteorological conditions. Calculations are based
on experiments and theoretical work relating to deposition vel-
ocities for different types of surface, shielding effect of
structures, and weathering.
The effects are described of different dose-reducing measures,
e.g., decontamination, relocation, destruction of contaminated
foodstuffs. The collective effective dose equivalent from ex-
ternal gamma radiation from deposited activity integrated over
a time period of 30 years, is calculated to be 3.6 Megamanrem
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in the BWR-3 case without dose-reducing measures. For the BWR-2
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1. INTRODUCTION
At the request of the National Agency for Environmental Protec-
tion , Riso National Laboratory published calculations of the
individual and population doses on Danish territory that might
result in the event of core-melt accidents at the Barseback
nuclear power plant in Sweden. This information was issued in
1977 in a report Ris0-R-356 under the title "Calculation of the
Individual and Population Doses on Danish Territory Resulting
from Hypothetical Core-melt Accidents at the Barseback Reactor".
In connection with this report Riso made different supplementary
calculations for the Agency in the following years. These re-
lated/ e.g., to the radioactive contamination of areas of land
in Denmark that might result from such an accident.
However, because the Barseback plant lies close to Copenhagen,
the Agency wished to have a more detailed treatment of the
problem of land contamination, and thus a Working Group was set
up in December 1978 to deal with this matter. The Group was to:
- Describe the fallout of radioactive material on Danish
territory that might occur in the event of an accident
at the Barseback plant. This description was to cover
selected accident sequences and meteorological situa-
tions.
- Evaluate the possibility and the costs of different
measures to limit the radiation level in areas affected
by radioactive fallout.
- Evaluate to what degree utilization of the contaminated
areas should be restricted. In continuation of this point
the Group was to assess the consequences to society of
such situations.
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Apart from making use of the basic material relating to such
work that was in the possession of or obtainable by the Agency
and by the National Health Authority, the Group could ask for
assistance from Ris0f the civil defence authorities, the labour
authorities, and any other relevant bodies.
The present report deals with the calculations and investiga-
tions carried out at Riso as a basis for the work of this Group.
Just as was the case in the previous report, the basic principle
underlying the calculations was that unknown or uncertain fac-
tors should be evaluated very cautiously so that calculations
would not underestimate the effects of an accident at Barseback.
A number of conditions that were evaluated so cautiously in the
previous report that they are considered to have contributed to
a significant overestimation of the effects of an accident were
more thoroughly investigated in the present case. In these
areas it was thus possible to base the present calculations on
more realistic assumptions. This applies in particular to such
factors as deposition velocities, shielding effect of structures,
as well as run-off and weathering.
Comparing the present report with the previous one, it should
be noted that the meteorological conditions that have the most
serious contamination consequences are not the same as those
that give the greatest individual doses. For this reason, the
meteorological assumptions on which this report is based are
not the same as those treated in Riso Report 356.
There are no descriptions in the literature of work similar to
what had to be carried out at Riso. This necessitated experi-
ments to determine how the work could best be accomplished.
Moreover, because activities had to be completed within a couple
of years, calculations had to be carried out side by side with
experimental work and with literature studies made in order to
establish the assumptions on which to base the calculations.
This left its mark on some of the methods used in the report.
For example, it was not possible to take into account entirely
correctly the variations from place to place of the deposition
- 7 -
velocities because this would have required a more advanced
dispersion model. However, the methods applied do not signifi-
cantly increase the uncertainty.
Furthermore, because of the limited time available, it was only
possible to carry out detailed calculations for two combinations
of release and meteorological conditions; and, of these, major
efforts were put into the most extreme combination.
In order to issue an English-language version of the present
report within as short a space of time as possible, it was de-
cided not to re-edit it with a view to readers abroad. The orig-
inal Danish version was thus translated with little or no alter-
ation, except for the deletion of some material that would be
without interest for readers outside Denmark.
The authors are indebted to Mrs Jennifer Paris for carrying out
the translation and to Mrs Kama Hansen for typing the report.

- 9 -
2. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
An evaluation was made of the long-term consequences of radio-
active contamination of Danish territory after core-melt acci-
dents at the nuclear power plant at Barseback, Sweden (20 km
east of Copenhagen).
The effects of different dose-reducing measures such as decon-
tamination , relocation and destruction of contaminated food-
stuffs are described.
The calculations make use of the same release fractions for the
radionuclides released by the reactor as used in the American
Reactor Safety Study (NRC 75). Very recentlyf however, new
evaluations of the possible magnitudes of radioactive releases
have been published (Le 80f NRC 81).
In addition, in October 1981, the Swedish government decided
that the Barseback plant should be furnished with a system that
can reduce any overpressure in the reactor containment by means
of ventilation through a filter system. In reality, this ex-
cludes any possibility of containment failure as a consequence
of overpressure.
It was not possible to take this recent information into ac-
count in the present report.
2.1. The most probable consequences
The conditions that must prevail if an accident at Barseback is
to affect Danish territory are: a melt-down of the reactor core
and, at the same time, failure of the pressure-tight reactor
containment and, finally, the wind must be blowing in the di-
rection of Zealand.
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If all three conditions are fulfilled, the result would prob-
ably be a combination of a BWR-3 release and weather conditions
of Pasquill stability category D without precipitation and with
a wind speed of 10 m/s.
Under such circumstances there would be no acute (non-stochas-
tic) effects on the health of the population in the Zealand
area, according to Riso Report 356.
Calculations in the present report show that the collective
doses from such an accident would not exceed 0.6 Megamanrem
from the passage of the cloud and 3.6 Megamanrem integrated
over 30 years from the deposited activity. It would hardly be
reasonable to relocate the population from the area other than
from minor, local hot spots. As a result of fire-hosing of the
roads within an area of approx. 20 km2 and digging the gardens
inside an area of some 150 km2f the collective doses from de-
posited activity could be reduced by approx. 1 Megamanrem.
After such an accident, if the crops produced during the first
year are destroyed and alterations are made in agricultural
production inside an area of up to 3500 km2, the collective
dose as a result of the consumption of contaminated foodstuffs
would not exceed 0.2 Megamanrem. (If, instead, only the crops
are destroyed, then the collective dose would be maximum 4 Mega-
manrem. If no action is taken whatsoever, the corresponding
dose would be maximum 23 Megamanrem).
Supplementary calculations show that it could prove necessary,
in addition, to place restrictions on agricultural production
on the island of Funen; otherwise agricultural products from
this area could give a collective dose of up to 5 Megamanrem.
If the above-mentioned action is taken, an accident of the
type concerned could result in a total collective dose that
hardly exceeds 3.4 Megamanrem. Under the assumption that 1 Mega-
manrem results in approx. 100 deaths from cancer, the dose in
question would imply approx. 340 deaths from cancer. In compari-
son, more than 200 000 of one million Danes (corresponding to
- 11 -
the number affected by the release) "normally" die as a result
of cancer.
The probability of a BWR-3 release occurring at Barseback is
about 2 x 10""5 per reactor year if the accident frequency used
in WASH-1400 can be applied to Barseback.
2.2. Extreme consequences
The most serious combination of accident circumstances, seen
from the viewpoint of land contamination, would be a BWR-2 re-
lease under weather conditions of Pasquill stability category F
with meandering, without precipitation and with a wind speed of
5 m/s.
Nevertheless, these circumstances would not lead to acute (non-
stochastic) effects on the health of the population of Zealand.
The calculations published in the present report show that the
collective dose would not exceed about 9 Megamanrem from the
passage of the cloud and approximately 41 Megamanrem integrated
over 30 years from external radiation from the deposited acti-
vity. Relocation of 100 000 people for the first month after
the accident would reduce the collective dose from deposited
activity by approximately 1 Megamanrem. Relocation of 600 000
people would reduce the dose by approximately 4 Megamanrem.
It appears unnecessary to limit occupational activities, even
in areas where the population is otherwise relocated. This is
because the hours in which work usually takes place comprise
only a fraction of the hours of a week and because work nor-
mally takes place in large, well shielded buildings. It cannot
be excluded that it might be necessary to place restrictions
on a few places of work, but the most important functions of
society could be maintained.
A further reduction of the collective dose by approximately 21
Megamanrem could be achieved by fire-hosing the roads inside an
- 12 -
area of approx. 130 km2 and by digging the gardens of houses in-
side an area of 1400 km2. This would reduce the collective dose
integrated over 30 years from external radiation from deposited
activity to approximately 15 Megamanrem.
If it is deemed appropriate to reduce the collective dose still
further, the report describes a number of other measures that
could be applied.
If the crops growing during the first year after such an acci-
dent are destroyed and alterations are made in agricultural pro-
duction inside an area of up to 3500 km2, the collective dose as
a result of the consumption of contaminated foodstuffs can be
kept below 1.4 Megamanrem. (If only the crops are destroyed, the
collective dose would be maximum 29 Megamanrem. If no action is
taken, the corresponding dose would be maximum 197 Megamanrem).
Supplementary calculations show that, in addition, it could be
necessary to place restrictions on agricultural production on
the island of Funen; otherwise agricultural products from this
area could give a collective dose of up to 8 Megamanrem.
If these measures are implemented, this extreme accident case
could only imply a collective dose of up to about 25 Megamanrem,
which would result in up to 2500 deaths from cancer. As men-
tioned previously, there would "normally" occur more than 200 000
deaths from cancer in a population group of this size.
The probability that a release from Barseback would affect the
metropolitan area of Copenhagen under meteorological conditions
classed as Pasquill F is about 0.5% (cf. Riso Report 356). If
the accident frequency used in WASH-1400 is applicable, the
probability of a BWR-2 release occurring at Barseback is about
6 x 10""6. This means that the probability of the consequences
described above is about 3 * 10"^ (which corresponds on average
to once per 30 000 000 reactor operation years).
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2.3. Uncertainties
The whole character of the present work implies that the calcu-
lations presented in this report are associated with consider-
able uncertainty. There aref however, some factors that should
be taken into account.
For the individualf the risk that he/she will suffer from cancer
as a result of the accident just described depends on the radi-
ation dose he/she receives - but even the largest radiation
doses that might occur without decontamination procedures would
only imply a slight increase of the already existing probability
of suffering from cancer.
Thus the collective doses and not the individual doses should
be the focus of attention. This means that the uncertainty as-
sociated with the behaviour of the individual, or with the
exact geographical distribution of the contamination, etc., be-
comes less significant because the uncertainty of the calculated
individual dose levels is smoothed out when these are summed
over a larger population group.
Another factor that should be noted is that the calculations
tend to overestimate the effects, because conditions of which
there is only little knowledge are estimated very cautiously.
In connection with the effects of land contamination for so
long a period of time as 30 years, it is obvious that during
this time changes would invariably be made that would remove
contamination - e.g., renewal of road surfaces, demolition of
buildings, re-roofing, etc. In contrast it is extremely diffi-
cult to envisage any circumstances that would increase the dose
rate.
Despite the difficulty inherent in assessing the uncertainty of
these calculations, it is most probable that the doses that
might occur from such an accident would be significantly smaller
than those calculated in the present report.
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3. TYPES OF ACCIDENT AND MAGNITUDES OF RELEASE
3.1. Assumptions
For the evaluation of the consequences of land contamination in
the event of a serious accident at Barseback, the Working Group
set up two requirements pertaining to the determination of the
amount of radioactive material that might be released from the
reactors. The first was that the release should be calculated
on the basis of (internationally) established models. The second
was that the type of accident should be selected so that the
calculated consequences pf contamination would be the greatest
possible.
The first requirement implied that the starting-point for the
calculations would be the release categories used in WASH-1400
(NRC 75). To date, two comprehensive investigations of the re-
lease of radioactive material from nuclear power stations in
given accident scenarios have been published. One is WASH-1400
and the other is the risk study carried out in the Federal Re-
public of Germany. In the present version of the latter, how-
ever, the release calculations are based on the models and
methods used in the WASH-1400 study, but applied to a German
reactor. In addition, this study does not concern a boiling-
water reactor but a pressurized-water reactor - the Barseback
reactors are of the former type.
As caesium is a radioactive material that might be released in
relatively large amounts during an accident owing to its low
boiling point, and because it has a long half-life (approx. 30
years), Cs contamination might be of long duration. On this
background, it appears that the second requirement implies a
choice amongst accidents giving the largest releases of Cs.
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3.2. Release category
The WASH-1400 release categories that give the greatest release
of radioactive materials are termed BWR-1 and BWR-2. The re-
lease of Cs in the two cases is 40% and 50%, respectivelyf of
the total content of Cs in the reactor core at the start of the
accident. Release category BWR-2 was thus chosen as the start-
ing-point for calculating the contamination subsequent to an ac-
cident.
The composition of the release, in categories 1-4, is given in
table 3.1. For the isotopes of greatest importance from the ra-
diological viewpoint, the table gives the release to the sur-
roundings in % of the total content in the reactor core of the
nuclides concerned at the start of the accident.
Table 3.1. Release in % of total content
Isotopes
Xenon, krypton
Iodine, bromine
Caesium, rubidium
Tellurium, tin
Barium, strontium
Ruthenium, molybdenum
Lanthanum, cerium, neptunium
BWR-1
100
40
40
70
5
50
0.5
BWR-2
100
90
50
30
10
3
0.4
BWR-3
100
10
10
30
1
2
0.3
BWR-4
60
0.08
0.5
0.4
0.06
0.06
0.01
The total content of radioactive isotopes was calculated apply-
ing the same assumptions as used in WASH-1400, but taking into
account the fact that the Barseback reactors are smaller than
the Peach Bottom reactor used in the WASH-1400 study (He 77).
The contents appear from table 3.2.
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Table 3.2. Fission product inventory of the Barseback
reactor. Activity in MCi. TR is the time elapsed since
the start of the accident.
Isotope TK=0 TK=2h TK=30h
Co
Co
Kr
Kr
Kr
Kr
Rb
Sr
Sr
Sr
Y
y
Zr
Zr
Nb
Mo
Tc
Ru
Ru
Ru
Rh
Te
Te
Te
Te
Te
Te
Sb
Sb
I
I
I
I
I
Xe
Xe
Cs
Cs
Cs
Ba
La
Ce
Ce
Ce
Pr
Nd
Np
Pu
Pu
Pu
Pu
Am
Cm
Cm
58
60
85
85m
87
88
86
89
90
91
90
91
95
97
95
99
99m
103
105
106
105
127
127m
129
129m
131m
132
127
129
131
132
133
134
135
133
135
134
136
137
140
140
141
143
144
143
147
239
238
239
240
241
241
242
244
0.78
0.29
0.45
16.60
29.90
42.20
0.014
43.90
3.53
75.30
3.60
56.50
75.10
81.40
75.50
81 .60
77.40
66.90
24.50
10.60
39.40
2.53
0.38
14.70
2.40
6.56
60.30
1 .85
15.50
46.60
62.90
90.10
111.11
85.50
89.30
25.80
3.00
0.82
4.52
79.30
80.50
74.00
69.60
57.10
69.40
30.30
901.20
0.03
0.01
0.01
1.80
0.001
0.27
0.012
0.78
0.29
0.45
12.30
10.00
25.70
0.014
43.80
3.53
65.30
3.60
56.50
75.10
75.10
75.50
79.80
77.20
66.90
18.60
10.60
37.90
2.53
0.38
13.20
2.39
6.27
59.20
1 .82
11.30
46.40
63.50
84.00
47.70
69.60
89.30
32.90
3.00
0.82
4.52
78.90
80.50
74.00
66.70
57.10
69.40
30.20
883.80
0.03
0.01
0.01
1.80
0.001
0.27
0.012
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
43
3
8
3
55
74
24
75
59
61
66
0
10
22
2
0
1
2
3
46
1
0
42
51
33
0
3
84
16
3
0
4
74
78
72
37
57
68
28
624
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
.77
.29
.45
.15
.00
.025
.013
.80
.53
.78
.58
.70
.10
.00
.50
.50
.90
.90
.24
.60
.10
.33
.38
.63
.34
.28
.00
.47
.12
.40
.10
.00
.00
.83
.10
.30
.00
.77
.52
.10
.80
.10
.00
.00
.30
.00
.80
.03
.01
.01
.80
.001
.27
.012
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3>3. Accident sequences
The release discussed in the foregoing section is not the re-
sult of a certain chain of accident events; it is representative
of a number of chains of event that are identified in WASH-1400.
A large part of the probability for the occurrence of a BWR-2
release originates from an accident starting with a non-defined
transient that results in shut-down of the reactor, i.e. the
fission process is brought to a standstill. Because of the con-
tent of radioactive materials in the fuelr heat would still be
generated. Hereafter, all the systems that should carry heat
away from the reactor tank and condensation basin at the bottom
of the reactor containment are assumed to fail. Thus, the con-
densation basin is heated so much that steam pressure leads to
a rupture of the reactor containment. It is furthermore assumed
that the containment fails in such a way that it gives direct
pathway from the containment to the surroundings of the plant.
Some time later the water in the reactor tank boils away and
the core starts to melt. During the melt-down a very large part
of the more volatile fission products (including Cs) would be
released from the fuel because of the high temperature (1800-
2400°C) and because of the large surface area of the molten
fuel. The flow of steam and hydrogen, in which the hydrogen is
created through a reaction between water and metal in the reac-
tor core, can now transport the radioactive materials from the
reactor tank via the containment out to the surrounding area.
The other accident sequences that lead to a BWR-2 release start
with a loss-of-coolant accident with subsequent failure of all
emergency cooling systems. The reactor tank is thus emptied of
water after a longer or shorter time period. The reactor core
is then entirely without cooling and melts. Only when a large
portion of the core has melted will the molten material fall
to the bottom of the reactor tank. After roughly half an hour
the molten material melts through the reactor tank and falls
to the floor below the tank.
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Hereafter it is assumed that there is either a steam explosion
when the molten metal comes into contact with the water, or
that there is a rather slower build-up of pressure because of
the generation of steam and gas (hydrogen and carbon dioxide)
on contact between the molten metal, water and concrete. In
both cases the reactor containment is presumed to fail, leading
to a direct pathway from the containment to the environment.
Again it is the flow of gases and steam that transports the
radioactive materials to the outside area.
Thus the common factor in accident sequences leading to a BWR-2
release is that the accident involves a failure of the reactor
containment, giving a direct pathway to the environment. Should
the failure take place so that the building surrounding the
containment is little damaged, or damaged in such a way that
the transport of radioactive materials takes place via the re-
actor building, then this acts as a filter and the release is
substantially reduced. This filter effect is the result of a
tendency of the radioactive materials to settle on walls and
objects inside the reactor building. (If the filter effect is
manifested, then the release is that termed in WASH-1400 a
BWR-3, instead of a BWR-2).
3.4. Comparison between WASH-1400 and Barseback
Calculations relating to the WASH-1400 BWR-2 release used in
this study were based on the construction of the Peach Bottom
reactor in the USA. Thus it is of interest to investigate if
the differences in the construction of the Barseback reactors
and that at Peach Bottom have any significant influence on the
results.
Taking constructional differences into account, the main as-
sumptions for a release of BWR-2 character will be the same.
Hence the accident must involve a core melt-down, and there
must be a failure of the reactor containment leading to a di-
rect pathway to the environment.
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For the accident sequences where the reactor containment fails
before the core starts to melt, there is no reason to assume
that the release at the start of an accident at Barseback or at
Peach Bottom would differ significantly. Taking appropriate ac-
count of the size of the reactors, the amounts of gas and steam
that would be generated during the melt-down would not differ;
furthermore it is assumed that direct access to the surroundings
would be established. The decontamination processes that might
affect the release would depend on the volumes and cross sec-
tional areas of the reactor tanks and containments. Relatively
viewed, these values are just about equal, so there is no reason
to presume that the retention of radioactive materials would
differ very much in the two set-ups.
On the other hand, the later stages of the accident and the ac-
cident sequences where the containment fails after the molten
core falls to the ground inside the containment could well de-
velop differently in the two types of reactor. This is because
the concrete of the Barseback plant, in contrast to that at
Peach Bottom, does not contain a limestone aggregate. In addi-
tion, the flooring beneath the reactor tank at Barseback is ap-
proximately 1 m thick and below this lies the condensation
basin. The small content of limestone in the Barseback concrete
implies a lesser generation of carbon dioxide on interaction
with the melt. This in turn means that there would be less gas
to transport radioactive materials, and thus a smaller release.
However, if a large part of the radioactive material was re-
leased already during the melt-down and transported out to the
surroundings, then a BWR-2 release might result after all.
For sequences where the containment fails later in the accident,
the production of less carbon dioxide implies a delay of the
failure, in addition to less transport of radioactive material.
This delay would presumably bring about a further reduction in
the release of the specially volatile fission products (e.g.,
Cs). These would be released from the molten fuel at an early
stage of the accident, and thus be released into the contain-
ment before this failed. Therefore there is a possibility that
the radioactive material is deposited in the containment be-
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fore the start of the release. In addition, the reduced produc-
tion of gas reduces the flow rates.
If the concrete flooring is melted throughf the molten core
falls into the condensation basin. Contact between the melt and
the water would lead to intense generation of steam and - with
slight probability - a steam explosion. In both cases there is
a chance that the containment would fail - if it had not done
so already. However, there is also a possibility that the melt
cools down and that steps could be taken to cool it further,
without any failure taking place. If steps can be taken to con-
tinue to cool the melt, then no further release takes place.
Therefore the differences between Barseback and Peach Bottom
are no greater than that it is reasonable to assume that a BWR-2
release could take place at Barseback, just as it could at Peach
Bottom.
3.5. Probability of the BWR-2 release category
According to WASH-1400 the probability of a BWR-2 release is
6*10"6 per reactor year.
As mentioned earlier, it was decided in the present investiga-
tion to study the consequences of accidents involving a large
release and especially those involving a large release of Cs.
In the case of a boiling-water reactor the two categories giving
the greatest release are BWR-1 and BWR-2. The difference in Cs
release between BWR-1 and BWR-2 is not, however, greater than
that the probability of a large Cs release should be calculated
as the sum of the probabilities of the BWR-1 and BWR-2 releases.
This is, however, of little importance because the probability
of a BWR-1 release is 10~6 per reactor year according to WASH-
1400. The resulting probability of a large Cs release then only
increases from 6 • 10""^  to 7 • 10""^  per reactor year.
Moreover, recent investigations seem to prove that a BWR-1 re-
lease would not be able to take place at all. A BWR-1 release
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implies, namelyf the occurrence of a steam explosion in the
reactor tank that leads to failure of the tank and containment
when the molten core falls to the bottom of the tank.
Sandia Laboratories recently carried out a number of studies
concerning, e.g., steam explosions in a reactor tank (Be 80).
These primarily concerned pressurized-water reactors. The result
was reached that the probability of a steam explosion following
a core melt-down, leading to containment failure, is 100 times
less than the value reached in WASH-1400. The probability for
containment failure resulting from a steam explosion in the re-
actor tank after a core melt-down is thus estimated to be ap-
proximately 10~4. Moreover, the Sandia investigations seem to
indicate that reasons will be found for lowering this value
still further so that, in practice, the possibility of a steam
explosion with subsequent containment failure can be entirely
ruled out.
A similar conclusion was reached in Sweden. Here an expert
committee, set up by the government in 1980, concluded on the
basis of present knowledge and on hearings of experts from the
USA and the Federal Republic of Germany, that the design of
safety systems for a reactor, and plans for emergencies, did
not need to take into account accidents involving steam explo-
sions of an intensity that could lead to failure of the reac-
tor tank or containment (In 80).
Moreover, for Barseback, studies are presently being made of
special filters connected to the containment. Such filters
would consist of a very large space filled with stones followed
by a large sand filter. This arrangement will be connected with
the reactor containment by a tube having a large diameter. This
would be closed by a safety valve or rupture disk during normal
reactor operation. If pressure in the containment rises to
close that which leads to containment failure, passage to the
filter system is opened. The volume of this system and the heat
capacity of the contents are large enough to prevent the steam
and gases produced by a core melt-down from raising the pressure
in the containment and filter chamber to close to the ultimate
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until after a suitable length of time has elapsed. In this man-
ner the majority of the radioactive material would be deposited
in the containment and filter. Should the pressure again reach
values where there is risk of failure, controlled ventilation
of the filter chamber can be effected. At the point in time
when this might take place, the amount of radioactive gases and
aerosols that could be released would have been reduced by sev-
eral orders of magnitude. Exceptions would, of course, be the
noble gases that are not trapped in filters and the like. How-
ever, the release of the radioactive noble gases is less serious
than that of other materials because these gases do not take
part in the biological chains.
A filter arrangement such as that described can be expected to
function with great reliability. As such filters are expected
to be installed at Barseback in 1986, the probabilities of a
core melt-down leading to a BWR-2 or BWR-3 release are reduced,
and the largest release that can then be expected with some
probability to result from a core melt accident is in the BWR-4
category (see table 3.1).
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4. DEPOSITION VELOCITIES (wet and dry)
4.1. Introduction
Matter, particulate or gaseous, is transferred from the atmos-
phere to surfaces by a number of different processes. These
processes are collectively called deposition. Deposition de-
pends on three types of parameter: parameters describing the
matter to be deposited (particle size, distribution, etc.), me-
teorological parameters (temperature, humidity, wind velocity,
etc.) and surface parameters (vegetation type, density, physi-
ology, etc.)
The concept of deposition velocity, vg, was introduced by
Chamberlain in 1953 (Ch 53). He defined vg as
vg(z) = F/X(x,y,z) (4.1)
where F is the flux to the surface, i.e. material deposited (in
g or curie) per unit area and time, and X(x,y,z) is the volume-
tric concentration in the air at a reference point (x,y,z) above
the surface. Vg can also be defined as
vg(z) = FT/XT(x,y,z) (4.2)
where F»p is the total amount of material deposited per unit
area and X«p(x,y,z) is the corresponding time integral of the
concentration in the air. It should be noted that Vg is a func-
tion of reference height to the surface. The normal reference
height is 1 m above ground, and vg is normally given in the
unit cm/s.
When discussing deposition velocities it is appropriate to div-
ide the deposition processes into different groups according to
types of material (gases, particles), meteorological conditions
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(dry or wet deposition), and types of surface (rough and smooth
surfaces). All deposition processes are described in detail in
a recent report (Ni 81).
As main emphasis was placed on the dry situation in the dose cal-
culations in the present report, dry deposition is treated in
greatest detail.
4.2. Dry deposition on rough surfaces
The term rough or pervious surfaces denotes surfaces covered by
vegetation, such as fields.
4.2.1. Gases
For dry deposition of the gases associated with a reactor acci-
dent, it is only necessary to consider elementary iodine and
gaseous compounds containing iodine, e.g., methyl iodine (CH3I),
There are many experimental determinations of deposition vel-
ocities for iodine on rough surfaces (He 80, Se 80, Ni 81).
It is important to realise that gases cannot be deposited more
rapidly than they can be transported to the surface by the tur-
bulent flow. This means that if, very pessimistically, one as-
sumes a perfectly absorbing surface, vg will always be less
than u^/u where u^ is the friction velocity and u is the wind
speed. For typical values u =0.3 m/s and u = 5 m/s, a maxi-
mum Vg value is obtained of 1.8 cm/s. In practice, however,
Vg will always be somewhat smaller.
Using the many experimental determinations of dry-deposition
velocities for iodine as a basis, it can be concluded that a
typical Vq value for iodine can be put at 0.7 cm/s, and that it
would be very improbable that Vg for iodine would exceed 1 cm/s,
For methyl iodine, vg is approximately 100 times less than for
iodine.
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4.2.2. Particles
Radioactive material is absorbed more or less effectively on
particles in the atmosphere. Dry deposition of particles takes
place by mechanisms which are radically different from those by
which gases are transferred. Particles are deposited either by
sedimentation or by collision. The relative frequency of these
processes depends primarily on particle diameter.
As in the case of gases, matter cannot be deposited more rapidly
than it can be transported to the surface. The maximum value of
v is the sum of u2/u and the sedimentation velocity vs
vc = —_ 1 (4.3)rs 18*v»p
where s is the particle diameter, g is the acceleration of
gravity, pp and p are the density of, respectively, the par-
ticle and the air, and v is the kinematic viscosity of air
(0.15 cm2 s~1 at 20°C).
As mentioned above, Vg depends primarily on the particle diame-
ter. To find the deposition velocities for an aerosol, knowledge
is thus needed of the distribution of particle sizes of the
aerosol. Normally this knowledge is limited. For aerosols as-
sociated with reactor accidents, Vg can be put at 1 cm/s (Se
80). It is very convenient to be able to use the same deposition
velocity for gases and for particles. As a common deposition
velocity for rough surfaces, use is made in the present report
of the value 2 cm/s. This choice is cautious with respect to
shorter distances, i.e., the most heavily contaminated areas,
whereas it might lead to an underestimation of contamination at
greater distances.
4.3. Dry deposition on smooth surfaces
Smooth or impervious surfaces are envisaged as those of roads,
the walls and roofs of structures, ground surfaces without vege-
tation, etc. As the greatest population concentrations are found
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in towns, it is very important to have a good determination of
deposition on smooth surfaces. In WASH-1400 it was pointed out
that there were only few experimental determinations of deposi-
tion velocities for smooth surfacesf especially for paved
areas (pavements, roads, roofs and walls of structures, etc.)*
Since then, only few further data have appeared (Ho 76, Jo 79).
These studies gave deposition velocities in the interval 0.02
to 0.03 cm/s, i.e., approximately a factor 100 lower than the
Vg used for rough surfaces in the present report. This is in
good agreement with a measurement of the accumulated dry deposi-
tion of fallout caesium on a covered, brick wall, which was car-
ried out by Roed (Ro 81). This author finds that dry deposition
on smooth surfaces is roughly a factor 80 less than on fields.
As the deposition velocity of fallout strontium on fields is
around 0.2 cm/s (Aa 79) and not 2 cm/s as used in the present
report, it is very cautious to put the deposition velocity on
smooth surfaces at 0.2 cm/s as is the case in the present report.
4.4. Wet deposition
The terminology dealing with wet deposition used in the litera-
ture is not entirely unambiguous. The term wash-out can just as
well be used instead of wet deposition. The possibility of wash-
out is determined by localization of the clouds, and by the in-
tensity of the precipitation - both of which can be stated ex-
plicitly. Details such as the shapes of snow crystals and the
distribution of raindrop sizes are also of importance, but nor-
mally these cannot be specified.
The properties of the material that is washed out are also of
importance. Firstly, the material can be either particulate
(e.g. caesium) or gaseous (e.g. iodine). Hence properties like
particle size distribution and reactivity towards water are im-
portant. The latter is clearly demonstrated by the two orders
of magnitude difference between the wash-out of iodine and that
of bromine - this can be attributed to the fact that bromine is
a hundred times more reactive towards water than iodine.
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Regardless of the type of material, wash-out is generally de-
scribed as an exponential process
X(t) = X(0) exp(-A-t) (4.4)
where X(t) is the concentration of the material remaining after
a time t, X(0) the concentration at time zero, and A is the
wash-out coefficient that represents the amount of material re-
moved from the cloud per unit time.
A is often expressed (Me 79, Gy 80) as
A = c-pa (4.5)
where c is a constant in s~1f p is the intensity of the precipi-
tation in mm/hr and a is an exponent in the interval 0.75 to 1.0,
Experimental determinations of A are few and very uncertain. The
results indicate that A for gaseous iodine is of the magnitude
10~6 s""1 (En 66). A for particles can be put at 10~5 s~1*p.
There are no reasons for imagining that snow wash-out is more
effective than rain wash-out (En 66).
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METEOROLOGY
5.1. Introduction
The materials that are released to the atmosphere following an
accident in a nuclear power plant are to a large extent gases,
droplets, and small particles, and these may be carried far
away by the wind in the same way as the exhaust from a smoke
stack. The simplest picture of the atmospheric transport mech-
anism is that of a horizontal plume, made up of the released
airborne material, and lined up with the direction of the wind.
The vertical and horizontal dimensions of this plume will in-
crease with increasing distance from the source because of the
turbulent mixing.
In the plume the concentration of the effluent will be deter-
mined mainly by the rate of release, the distance from the
source, the wind speed, the turbulence, and the removal by dry
and wet deposition.
The calculation of concentrations of radioactive material fol-
lowing a nuclear accident at Barseback will be based on such a
simple plume picture, namely the so-called Gaussian plume model,
and knowledge of the climatology in the area that can be af-
fected is consequently essential.
In the following the Gaussian plume model will be discussed, to-
gether with the influence of the state of the atmosphere on its
parameters.
5.2. The Gaussian plume model
The smoke issuing from a stack is only in exceptional cases
shaped as a smooth, horizontal cone with a straight axis. The
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exact deviation of the shape from this "ideal" is difficult to
determine, but fortunately it seems that in many cases (see,
e.g., Gi 68) the shape of the plume becomes quite regular if
averaged over a few minutes. This smooth average plume is really
what the Gaussian plume model is able to describe.
In its simplest form, the model is a statement about the concen-
tration X as function of the coordinates x, y, and z in a co-
ordinate system with the origin in the source, which is consid-
ered to be a point source, the x-axis in the mean wind direction,
and the z-axis vertical:
Q
 y2 Z2
X(x,y,z) = exp(- - ) . (5.1)
27TU
 °y °z 2aJ 2a|
Here Q is the source strength in, for example, Ci s""1 , u the wind
speed, and ay and az the distances in the vertical and lateral
directions from the axis at which for a particular x the concen-
tration has fallen to 1//e" ~ 0.6 of that at the axis. The two so-
called dispersion parameters ay and az are for given atmospheric
conditions functions of x only. The way in which ay and az
change with changing atmospheric parameters reflects, together
with the wind speed, the capability of the atmosphere to dilute
the released material.
The only atmospheric quantities entering directly into (5.1) are
wind speed and wind direction, which define the coordinate sys-
tem.
Time does not appear explicitly in the Gaussian plume picture,
and one can imagine that (5.1) describes a tube, extending from
the source to infinity, through which material is pushed at
speed u. As the amount crossing a vertical cross section per
unit time is proportional to u, and as the amount that has to
be transported away per unit time is constant, the concentra-
tion must be inversely proportional to u.
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As a rule the Gaussian plume model is not used in the form (5.1)
because the presence of the ground, or equivalently the effect
of the finite height H of the release point, must be taken into
account. It is generally assumed that the dispersed material is
reflected at the ground so that the effect of the release height
is accounted for by introducing an imaginary additional source
in the mirror image with respect to the ground. Instead of (5.1)
the concentration becomes
Q
X(x,y,z) = exp f -
2az /
(5.2)
/ (z+2H)2
exp - — ^ + exp - m
Z- • ' ZM O ry
The technical details of the application of the Gaussian plume
model in the Riso Model are given in Th 80.
in the following two subsections the applicability of the model
and the influence of the state of the atmosphere on its parame-
ters are discussed.
5.2.1. General applicability of the model
So far only one condition for the validity of the Gaussian model
has been mentioned, namely that the rough outlines of the in-
stantaneous plume must be smoothed over a period of time to make
it conform to the shape of a Gaussian plume. However, by this
stage a number of assumptions have been made for the application
of the model in the case of the dispersion of airborne material
from a source of pollution.
Firstly, the atmospheric turbulence must be homogeneous and
statistically stationary. This implies - in non-technical terms -
that there is statistically no beginning and no end, in space
or in time, of the turbulent wind field. Of course, the atmos-
phere is not that ideal and consequently this assumption can at
best be only approximately true. The diurnal variation of the
atmospheric parameters, for example, will totally invalidate
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stationarity over periods of more than a few hours. Further,
the sudden changes at sunrise and sunset may cause the atmos-
phere to respond in such a way that the stationarity assumption
will not be even approximately true, however brief the period
of time. Terrain features such as hills, valleys, trees, buil-
dings, and even changes in the horizontal directions of crops,
on the other hand, can bring into doubt the assumption of homo-
geneity in the horizontal directions. Most importantly, the very
presence of the ground seems to violate even the idea of homo-
geneity in the vertical direction. Because the wind speed is
zero at the ground, there must be a wind shear that will only
gradually disappear with distance from the ground. Therefore the
Gaussian plume model should not be expected to be any good if
the source is too close to the ground. However, because the
parameters used in the model are fitted to experimental data
from releases close to the ground, the model usually performs
reasonably well in such situations.
Formulas (5.1) and (5.2) indicate that the pollutants are trans-
ported in the wind direction by the mean wind and diffuse verti-
cally and laterally because of turbulent motion. The effect of
turbulence on longitudinal transport is entirely ignored. A suf-
ficient condition for this to be a good approximation is that
the root mean square wind speed au is small compared to u.
Usually this is not the case when u is small (say less than
0.5 ms~1), and under such circumstances there is so little
transport away from the source that a plume is not formed at
all. If u has a finite magnitude at the same time as au/u is
not small compared to unity, the longitudinal turbulent trans-
port may be neglected and the plume picture restored, if the
distance x from the source is large compared to the horizontal
spatial scale of the turbulence.
It has already been mentioned that time does not enter explicit-
ly into the Gaussian plume formula. It may enter indirectly
though, through ay and az. Time can also be considered as enter-
ing through the source strength Q and the wind speed u. This is
conceptionally a contradiction to the assumption about station-
arity, at least as far as u is concerned, but a possible way to
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deal with time-varying wet deposition on the ground, resulting
from a time-varying precipitation rate, is to ascribe the cor-
responding dilution of the plume to a time variation in Q. Real
time variation in Q, corresponding to the fact that a physical
source must at least have a time of start and a time of stop
can be thought of in this way: a certain amount of effluent,
truncated at both front and rear ends, but shaped according to
the "Gaussian cone", travels down this cone at the speed u, and
in this way exposes different places downstream from the source
at different times. The time variation of ay and az results
from the wavering of the plume under the influence of eddies
larger than the transversal plume dimensions. A subsection of
the following is devoted to a discussion of the growth of these
two parameters with time.
It should be mentioned that the Gaussian plume formula applies
to a point source. If the source has a finite spatial extent,
the resulting plume can be thought of as a sum of several point
sources, but usually it is easier and sufficiently accurate to
substitute the real situation by one in which there is one point
source upstream with respect to the real source containing the
whole source strength. The distance upstream is determined by
the transversal dimensions of the real source. Having "trav-
elled" from the fictitious point of release to the real source,
ay and az should be approximately equal to the transversal
dimensions of the source.
5.2.2. The influence of averaging time on the time-mean
concentrations
One of the characteristics of the Gaussian dispersion model
with dispersion parameters ay and az given as increasing func-
tions of the distance x from the source is that the plume con-
centration will decrease with x. Very often the Gaussian plume
is thought of as a cigar-shaped cloud which is constant with
time. In general this picture is incorrect because - as easily
appears from looking at the exhaust from a real stack - the plume
will waver in time in both the vertical and the lateral direc-
tion with respect to the mean wind direction. However, for
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practical computations, this steady Gaussian plume model will
generally give satisfactorily accurate results, provided that ay
and az are averaged over the specified time of interest. To
explain why this is so, a brief qualitative discussion of plume
kinematics is needed.
Consider a plume as being composed of a series of puffs as in-
dicated in Fig. 5.1, where such a series is shown in an instan-
taneous or "frozen" picture. (In order to illustrate the general
idea better, only a fraction of the total number of puffs is
shown). Each puff is transported away from the source by the
wind, and simultaneously it grows because of the action of tur-
bulent eddies with linear dimensions less than or equal to its
size. The technical term for this growth process is relative
diffusion, and the growth rate is determined mainly by eddies
of a size comparable to the puff itself. Statistically, the
average puff size will be a function only of x for a given at-
mospheric situation. The average instantaneous plume can thus
be characterised by the lateral and vertical root-mean-square
widths aOy (x) and aoz (x) as functions of x.
Short term
concentration
distribution'
Solirce
Long term-
concentration'
distribution
X
Long term
wind direction
Fig. 5.1. Series of puffs,
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As a puff moves with the wind, larger and larger eddies will
take part in and be responsible for its growth. The eddies
larger than the puff, on the other hand, will make it move
around in a random fashion and give rise to the aforementioned
wavering of the plume. At a particular distance x downstream
from the source, and along an axis determined by the long-term
wind direction, the puffs will pass a plane perpendicular to
this direction with a randomly varying distance of their centres
from the axis. For short-term averaging, the root-mean-square
distance will be smaller than the corresponding long-term aver-
aged root-mean-square distance. This is indicated in Fig. 5.1,
where the short- and long-term distributions of the puff dis-
tances from the axis are shown. The long-term distribution has
its maximum at the axis and is broader than the short-term
distribution, the maximum of which is off the axis, in general.
The root-mean-square widths of these distributions of distances
from the axis are functions of both distance x and averaging
time T. They are directly related to the concentration distri-
butions, for which the total-root-mean-square widths are found
by adding the root-mean-square distance and the root-mean-square
puff size "by the squares" in both the vertical and the lateral
direction. Expressed formally, the mathematical relations are
a| (X,T) = <j2y (X) + a|y (x,T) (5.3a)
and
a| (X,T) = a^z (X) + a^z (x,T) , (5.3b)
where a^y (x,T) and aiz (x,T) are the root-mean-square horizontal
and vertical distances from the axis at the distance x for the
averaging time T.
Later a case in which the relative diffusion may be neglected
will be discussed, but in general both this and the "random walk"
contributions (a^y and ajz) must be considered. The relative im-
portance of the two terms will change with x for a fixed T. The
relative diffusion will become more and more important with in-
creasing distance, because the puffs will grow and comprise
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larger and larger eddies in their growth, until in the last some-
what speculative stage all turbulence on all scales is involved
in the relative diffusion. For distances shorter than several
tens of the linear scale of the turbulence, dimensional argu-
ments together with order-of-magnitude evaluations show that
relative diffusion is unimportant if the averaging time is large
compared with the Eulerian time scale. Under such circumstances
several formulas have been suggested to relate root-mean-square
width at one averaging time to that at another. The one chosen
here is the same as used in Th 80, namely
/T \1/3
ay (x,T) = ay (x,T = To) x f j (5.4a)
\ To '
and
1/3
az (x,T) = oz (x,T = To) x ( ) • (5.4b)
where T is measured in seconds and T o is equal to 1800 seconds,
5.3. Atmospheric parameters
Before plume formulas (5.1) or (5.2) can be used in a computer
model, the wind direction and the actual magnitudes of Q, u, ay,
az and H have to be determined. The only parameters that are
determined directly are the wind speed and direction. As men-
tioned before, the source strength Q used in (5.1) or (5.2) need
not be the actual amount of material pouring out of the source
during one unit of time. A factor reducing Q is introduced to
account for losses resulting from deposition and radioactive de-
cay. The atmospheric stability will influence both diffusion pa-
rameters ay and az, as well as the effective height of release
H. In this section the following meteorological parameters rele-
vant to dispersion in the atmosphere will be discussed: precipi-
tation and deposition, atmospheric stability, wind direction,
wind speed, and mixing height.
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5.3.1. Precipitation and deposition
Whether or not there is precipitation is of great importance
for the rate of removal of pollutants from the plume. In the
case of no precipitation the plume is diluted only because of
deposition on the ground. For a definition of this concept see
chapter 4. In this case the lower boundary of the plume is af-
fected directly. When there is precipitation the interior of
the plume will be diluted directly.
The efficiency of dry deposition depends largely on the wind
speed and the turbulence intensity, but the physical, chemical,
photochemical, and biochemical processes taking place at the
surface when material is deposited are also of much importance.
To a large extent these processes depend on the form of the
pollutant, i.e. whether it is a gas or an aerosol and, in the
latter case, what the particle sizes are. As deposition veloci-
ties depend strongly on the type of material to be deposited,
the composition of the plume changes downstream in the sense
that the ratios between the concentrations of the different
constituents change with their distances from the source.
In the case of precipitation, there is wet removal of effluents.
It is important to distinguish between below-cloud scavenging,
or wash-out, and in-cloud scavenging, or rain-out. For wash-out,
a removal rate or wash-out coefficient 1 (s~1) is introduced
usually (see eqs. 4.4 and 4.5). This is proportional to the pre-
cipitation rate; for gases it is a function of how close the
concentration in the water drops is to the equilibrium concen-
tration, and for aerosols a function of the aerosol and drop
sizes. The latter could also be termed a collection efficiency.
Also in the case of wash-out the plume composition changes
downstream.
Rain-out refers to processes whereby material is removed from
the plume to the droplets or condensation nuclei of the clouds,
and where later a deposition can take place elsewhere with the
rain from the cloud. Rain-out can cause completely unpredictable
deposition patterns. On the one hand this can lead to a sig-
nificant reduction of concentration in the plume, but on the
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other, to areas with increased contamination at larger distances
from the source.
A quantitative description of this phenomenon would require as
a minimum a qood model for cloud dynamics, including condensa-
tion processes, in particular the effect of condensation nuclei.
It must also be realized that neglect of this phenomenon would
lead to an overestimation of the predicted doses in the cases
where rain-out would have taken place.
In the Gaussian model, dry deposition and wash-out are accounted
for by source depletion. For dry deposition it means that Q is
reduced with a distance-dependent factor, as though the plume
was diluted with the same fraction through the entire cross
section at that distance. This does not correspond to what is
really taking place, because the effect of dry deposition must
be greater on the concentration close to the ground than on that
further away. However, the deposition is usually so small that
the approximation is considered to be quite accurate. For wash-
out, source depletion means that Q is reduced by both a space-
dependent and a time-dependent factor, where the latter reflects
the variation in precipitation intensity. This way of modelling
the wet scavenging is in principle completely correct if the
part of the plume being considered has horizontal dimensions
smaller than those of the rain belt.
It should be borne in mind that if it is raining, wash-out is
in general more efficient in diluting the plume than dry depo-
sition. If we measure the efficiency of wash-out in terms of a
deposition velocity, vg will be about azlg, which is typically
0.03 m/s, but this can be as large as of the order of 1 m/s,
whereas vg for dry deposition is typically about 0.01 m/s or
less.
5.3.2. Atmospheric stability
The stability of the atmosphere is an important concept for de-
scribing the dispersion conditions in the atmosphere. It can be
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illustrated by the following example: If a small parcel of air
is moved upward (or downward), it will expand (or be compressed)
because the pressure in the atmosphere decreases with height.
As the volume of the parcel changes, so does its temperature, a
decrease in temperature corresponding to expansion and vice
versa. This type of thermodynamic process where no heat is trans-
ferred is called an adiabatic expansion (or compression) and the
change in temperature which occurs can be computed if the varia-
tion of pressure with height is specified. In the lower atmos-
phere the temperature change with height for an adiabatic expan-
sion is -1°C per 100 m altitude increase.
If the surrounding atmosphere has a temperature distribution
that decreases with height at the same rate, the air parcels
will be in equilibrium with each other. In this case the condi-
tion of the atmosphere is said to be neutral. Under situations
of neutral stability, atmospheric turbulence appears only as a
result of friction with the surface of the earth.
If the temperature in the atmosphere falls more than 1°C for a
height increase of 100 m, a parcel which is moved upward will
arrive at surroundings that are relatively colder. As the warmer
parcel is lighter it will have a positive buoyancy and the up-
ward movement will continue. If, on the other hand, the parcel
is moved downwards it will arrive at surroundings that are rela-
tively warmer, and the movement will therefore continue downward.
Under such unstable conditions where each movement in the verti-
cal direction is increased, a stronger turbulence results than
in a neutral situation. If a condition like this prevails, the
atmosphere is said to be unstable.
If the temperature in the atmosphere falls less than 1°C for a
height increase of 100 m, or if the temperature rises with in-
creasing height, it can be seen by arguments analogous to those
above that turbulent motions will be counteracted. In such situ-
ations where buoyancy forces act to oppose vertical motions the
condition of the atmosphere is said to be stable. In a stable
atmosphere, the turbulence level is less than in the neutral at-
mosphere, and in a case of strong stability turbulent motions
can be nearly eliminated.
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The Ris0 measurements show that unstable, neutral, and stable
atmospheric conditions occur for approximately 5%, 60%, and 35%
of the time, respectively.
The stability conditions in the atmosphere have a strong influ-
ence on its dispersive ability. An appreciation of this fact
can be gained by watching the visible behaviour of smoke in the
atmosphere. It is well known that the smoke trail from a tall
stack takes a variety of forms according to the weather con-
ditions and the time of day. Neutral conditions are charac-
terized by moderate wind speed and a thoroughly cloudy sky or
high wind speed with or without clouds. During neutral con-
ditions the smoke moves in a fairly straight well-defined trail
which increases in width and height as the distance from the
source increases. Unstable conditions are usually characterized
by light winds together with sufficient sunshine to warm the
ground surface. The smoke behaves in a very irregular fashion
and the strongly disturbed air over the heated surface leads to
a rapid spread in the vertical and to an erratic variation in
the direction of travel of successive sections of the smoke
plume; it rapidly reaches a stage where it is no longer visible.
Stable situations occur more frequently at night when the wind
is generally light and the sky sufficiently clear to result in
an appreciable cooling of the ground. Vertical and horizontal
spread is considerably reduced and the smoke moves downwind in
compact visible form for appreciable distances, often not in
a straight trail but rather like a meandering river.
The three categories described above constitute the simplest
classification of diffusive conditions. In the literature the
following terminology is often used:
Atmospheric conditions Plume behaviour
unstable looping
neutral coning
stable fanning
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w
UNSTABLE
(LOOPING)
NEUTRAL
(CONING)
STABLE
(FANNING)
Fig. 5.2. The three characteristic plume forms.
Many years of measurement of wind speed, wind direction, and
horizontal and vertical fluctuations of the wind direction, all
at the effective stack height, yield the best set of single-
point meteorological measurements for estimating climatological
statistics for the atmospheric dispersion ability with regard
to the stack under consideration. Measurements of wind direction
fluctuations are rather intricate turbulence measurements and
have rarely, if ever, been obtained on a climatological basis.
In practical diffusion calculations, meteorological specifica-
tions will often have to be in terms of the routine data avail-
able on mean wind speed and direction, and cloud cover or verti-
cal temperature gradient.
5.3.3. Mean wind direction
The mean wind direction is an important parameter in defining
the direction in which the plume is transported. The applica-
bility of the Gaussian plume model requires a steady mean wind
direction. A shift in the mean wind direction during a continu-
ous release will result in a larger area being passed by various
sections of the plume whereby the actual doses will be appreci-
ably smaller than calculated.
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5.3»4,_ Wind speed
The wind speed is directly important in determining the initial
dilution because the initial volume of air containing the amount
of material emitted in a given time must be proportional to the
wind speed. However, wind speed also has an additional control-
ling influence on diffusion through its effect on turbulent mix-
ing in the atmosphere. Turbulent mixing is also strongly influ-
enced by the state of the sky through its control of the thermal
stratification of the atmosphere.
5.3.5. Mixing height
Just as the vertical growth of a plume is limited by the pres-
ence of the ground, so can growth be limited from above. This
is, for example, the case when the layer in which the plume is
transported is of neutral stratification and has a stable layer
aloft. The layer of the lower atmosphere in which free vertical
plume rise and growth is possible is called the mixing layer.
Its thickness is called the mixing height.. The effect of a lim-
ited mixing height on vertical dispersion can be accounted for
in the same way as the effect of the ground, i.e. by using an
imaginary additional source in the mirror image with respect to
the top of the mixing layer. Often a simpler approach is used
where a uniform distribution of material in the vertical is as-
sumed from a distance which is twice the distance where the mix-
ing height equals the effective stack height plus twice the ver-
tical dispersion parameter. In the intermediate area between
this distance and that where the plume hits the top of the mix-
ing layer, the concentrations may be obtained by interpolation.
5.4. Stability classes and dispersion parameters
In the foregoing discussion of the state of the atmosphere and
its influence on the ability of the atmosphere to disperse a
continuous release, three states (dispersion categories) were
identified: unstable, neutral and stable. However, it is obvious
that the atmosphere does not assume only these three easily
identifiable states but that it displays a continuous spectrum
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of states. Nevertheless, because of the purely practical need
to identify the dispersion ability of the atmosphere by means
of routine meteorological measurements, a classification system
is used that builds not on three but on seven discrete catego-
ries. This is the Pasquill system (Pa 61) which ever since its
publication has been a basic reference system for nearly all
dispersion calculations. It contains the following classes:
A extremely unstable
B moderately unstable
C slightly unstable
D neutral
E slightly stable
F moderately stable
G extremely stable
When a stability class is to be determined on the basis of
routine measurements, a procedure established by Turner is
often used (Tu 64). Stability is here determined by wind speed
and a radiation index, the latter being determined by cloud
coverage, cloud height, the time, and the geographical position
of the meteorological station. The following diagram shows the
connection between radiation index, wind speed and stability
class. Intense incoming radiation corresponds to index = 4, and
a negative index to outgoing radiation.
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Another method often used to determine the stability class is
based on direct measurement of the vertical temperature gradient,
It has been established that class A corresponds to a tempera-
ture decrease over 100 m of 1.9°C or more, and class F to an in-
crease over 100 m of at least 1.5°C. The method is used where
temperature is measured at several heights, such as on a meteor-
ology tower, and where radiation is not measured.
Description
extremely unstable
moderately unstable
slightly unstable
neutral
slightly stable
very stable
Category
A
B
C
D
E
F + G
T( 100 m
<
-1.9
-1 .7
-1.5
-0.5
>
)
-1
to
to
to
to
1.
- T(0) m
.9
-1.7
-1.5
-0.5
1.5
5
The two methods rarely give exactly the same result: for a cli-
mate subject to maritime influence, the distribution of stab-
ility categories is often as appears in the following diagram.
occurs in % of the time
Category
Method 1 Method 2
(radiation) (temperature gradient)
A
B
C
D 75 60
E 10 30
F ) 8 8
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The usefulness of the above classification system lies particu-
larly in the fact that, for each stability category, a certain
variation of dispersion parameters with distance is prescribed,
There are a number of different works dealing with the depend-
ence of dispersion parameters on stability of which the best
known is the Workbook of Atmospheric Dispersion Estimates (Tu
70). This is often used as a basic reference.
5.5. Meteorological statistics
An assessment of conditions in the area of the Sound from the
viewpoint of meteorological dispersion in relation to the
Copenhagen-Barseback problemf and a description of the disper-
sion model used (the Gauss plume model), are found in chapter 4
and appendix 3 of He 77. On this basis, 21 "weather situations"f
namely classes B and D with a mean wind speed of 10 m/s and
class F with 5 m/sf were specified for a preliminary parameter
study. In each class use was made of three values for the dry-
deposition velocity (vg = 0.5; 1.0 and 2.0 cm/s). In class D, a
further three values were used for the wash-out coefficient
(lg-105 = 5f 10 and 20 s~1) and in class F calculations were
made both without meandering and with a meander factor of 4.
It appeared from this parameter study that the weather situa-
tions that could be unfavourable for Danish territory in the
event of a serious accident at Barseback can reasonably be as-
sumed to lie in classes D and F.
A further investigation of reasonable, but pessimistic, values
for wet and dry deposition parameters (chapter 4) then led to
the specification of five "weather situations" for the final
parameter study in chapter 7. It appears from the calculations
in chapter 7 that of the five situations selected, only D and F
are of interest. Both these were investigated individually in
He 77, but because of their importance for the present investi-
gation they have been analysed further.
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5.5.1. Extremely stable weather situations
Considering a plume that spreads in a very stable atmosphere,
it can be observed that its thickness az varies only slowly
with distance from the source. The plume can often be seen over
a distance of many km and at times it has large, horizontal
meanders. These result from large, two-dimensional eddies which,
because the stable atmosphere lacks the ability to produce new
turbulence, represent the remains of the original turbulence.
The eddies are transported with the wind in the direction that
this takes, and thus meandering occurs. Meandering means that
the temporal mean value of the concentration of the smoke at a
given spot downstream of the source can be considerably less
than the immediate value.
The phenomenon can be expressed quantitatively by means of equa-
tion (5.3a), as the occurrence of meandering means that while
a£y(x) is constantly relatively small, a|y(x,T) will in-
crease rapidly with T and thus usually be the dominant part for
release times T of one hour or more.
An attempt was made in He 77 to assess the possible existence
and effect of meandering, based on data measured both over land
and over water. The conclusion was reached that an increase of
the horizontal dispersion by a factor 4 to 6 relative to Pasquill-
Gifford (Tu 64) seems realistic under stable conditions with
little wind, and for an averaging time of three hours.
This effect was not included in the dose calculations in the
former report, as meandering gives a reduction of the largest
individual doses. On the other hand, the parameter study in
chapter 7 shows that category F with a meander factor gives the
most serious consequences associated with land contamination.
As is to be expected from the above qualitative considerations,
meandering usually occurs in connection with low wind speeds.
Thus the investigation in He 77 comprised wind speeds of be-
tween 1 and 3 m/s; in IAEA 80 it is recommended that use be made
of a meander factor of 4 for speeds below 2 m/s. It is, however,
a question whether there exists an upper wind speed above which
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meandering does not occur. This problem is analysed in Kr 81,
which gives a theoretical treatment of the subject of meander-
ing and analyses relevant data.
The result is that horizontal dispersion in a stable atmosphere
under certain simple assumptions is given by an expression very
similar to Taylor's diffusion theorem. Assuming an exponential
shape for the Eulerian and Lagrangian correlation function, an
expression is obtained where the horizontal dispersion parameter
Oy is given as a function of:
x distance from source to measuring-point (m)
T averaging time (s)
u mean wind speed in the direction of the mean wind vector
(over the time T) (m s""1),
o§ the variance of the component of the wind vector at
right angles to the mean wind direction (m^ s~2)
T L the Lagrangian time scale that is a characteristic time
for the large eddies (s)
TE the Eulerian time scale that is a characteristic time
for the atmospheric movements observed from the release
point (s),
making further assumptions relating to the Lagrangian and Eulerian
time scales.
The data analysis was carried out on data measured along Riso's
meteorology tower during the period 1976 to 1978. The result is
visualized in fig. 5.3f where ay (m) at a distance of 20 km is
calculated on the basis of measurements and plotted against the
mean wind speed. As expected, the points are somewhat scattered,
but it is obvious that ay is a decreasing function of wind
speed. The regression line introduced gives
ay(20 km) = 5400 x u~0-8 (5.5)
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Fig, 5.3. Plot of ay against u for a distance from the
source corresponding to 20 km and an averaging time of
three hours. The magnitude of ay is calculated by means
of Ris0 data from the period 1976-78. The unbroken line
represents a = 5400 * u"0*8. The dashed line gives a
from Turner's Workbook, Tu 70, corrected for a time-
averaging over three hours.
The calculations in chapter 7 make use of ay from Turner's
Workbook, which at a distance of 20 km from the source gives a
value of 500 m. This is corrected in the calculations for an
averaging time of 3 hours, corresponding to the release time of
a BWR-2 accident. The correction factor is given by (T/T Q) 1/ 3 f
where T is three hours and T o half an hour. The corrected value
for ay is then 900 m. This value is drawn as a dashed line on
the figure. The meandering factor used in some of the calcula-
tions in chapter 7 is set equal to 4, corresponding to ay(20) =
2000 m. For the selected wind speed of 5 m/s, this ay lies
above the regression line that gives ay = 1600 m.
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To determine whether dispersion over water in stable situations
follows the same pattern as found in the foregoing for disper-
sion over land, two years of data (1978-1979) from a 70 m high
meteorology tower on the island of Sprogo were analysed, ay(20
km) was again used as an example, calculated and plotted against
the wind speed (fig. 5.4). Just as the Riso data, the Sprogo
data seem to indicate that ay is a decreasing function of wind
speed. The regression line has the form:
ay(20 km) = 6000 x u~0-6 . (5.6)
Apparently, ay over water under stable conditions is larger
than it is over land. The scatter of points around the regres-
sion lines indicates, however, that it would be reasonable to
adopt one formula only that covers both land and water.
For the Sprogo data, a further calculation was made of ay at
the distances 10, 20, 30, 40, 60, 80, 100 and 120 km for the
wind speeds 1, 2, 4, 8 and 16 m/s. The result is shown on fig.
5.5 together with, respectively, ay uncorrected, ay time-average
corrected and ay meander corrected by a factor 4. As mentioned
above, the last ay curves are used in the calculations in chap-
ter 7 together with a wind speed of 5 m/s. This combination of
parameters seems to be in good agreement with the ay values cal-
culated on the Sprogo data.
For the Riso data, the analysis showed that stable periods of
special relevance to the present work occur approximately 30
times a year, while the Sprog0 data show a frequency that is
twice as large. Making a further assessment based on the Sprog0
data of the probability that, at an arbitrary point in time, a
stable period will occur, which then lasts at least 3 hours,
the probability is found to be approximately 1.2% without dis-
criminating for direction. If, further, one imposes the condi-
tion that the wind must blow from a 90° sector around east,
this probability is reduced to approximately a fifth (~ 0.25%).
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5000
Fig. 5,4. Plot of ay against u for a distance from the
source corresponding to 20 km and an averaging time of
3 hours. The magnitude of ay is calculated by means of
Sprogo data from the two-year period 1978-79. The un-
broken line represents a = 6000 * u~°*6. The dashed
line indicates ay from Turner's Workbookf Tu 70, cor-
rected for a time-averaging over 3 hours.
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Fig. 5.5, Plot of ay against the distance from the source
for wind speeds 1, 2, 4, 8 and 16 m/s and an averaging time
of 3 hours. The dashed lines represent, respectively, ay
from Turner's Workbookf Tu 70, (a^) and these values cor-
rected for time averaging by a factor (3/0.5)1/3 and meander-
ing by a factor 4.
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5.5.2. Weather situations with precipitation
In the parameter study in chapter 7, the neutral weather situ-
ation (D) with precipitation appears as a situation that could
be unfavourable for Danish territory in the event of a serious
accident at Barseback.
Using a measuring series from St. Hareskov covering 23 years
(1951-1973) the probability was assessed of a certain amount of
precipitation falling within a given period of time. The result
appears in table 5.1 , which gives the accumulated function of
the period under consideration with a temporal resolution of an
hour. As an example, the probability of less than 2 mm of rain
per hour over three hours is 99.7%, and of less than 1 mm fall-
ing in the same period of time 98.5% - which implies that the
probability of between 1 and 2 mm of rain falling per hour dur-
ing a time interval of 3 hours is 1.2%. The interval 0.1 mm
contains the probability for an amount of precipitation less
than or equal to 0.1 mmf for which reason this interval contains
all situations without precipitation.
As discussed earlier, wet deposition is parameterized in terms
of the rain intensity which is kept constant during the calcu-
lations in the dispersion model used. In so far as the assump-
tion of constant rain intensity over the whole area affected in
the course of the accident is reasonable, the statistics given
above are relevant.
5.6. Choice of meteorological parameters for the dose
calculations
The meteorological parameters included in the dose calculations
cannot be chosen independently of one another if the situations
modelled are also to be physically possible. On the other hand,
the stability classification schemes (section 5.4) give a very
simplified picture of the possible dispersion situations. For
example, the wind speed in one of the methods (that of Turner)
is limited to a certain interval in each class, while the
classes in the other method are independent of wind speed. Both
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methods are results of attempts to describe the average states
in the lowest hundreds of meters of the atmosphere. Therefore,
it is not uncommon to find individual situations that cannot be
classified immediately according to one or the other method.
Thus, the turbulent structure can very well correspond to class
A or F, even though the wind speed is greater than 3 m/sf in
contrast with the rules for Turner classification. Likewise,
the situation can well differ from that corresponding to Df
even though the wind speed is greater than 6 m/s and the sky
overcast (radiation index 0), for example, in the case of cold
air advection (i.e., a cold air mass is carried in above a warm
surface). The temperature gradient classification method offers
corresponding problems. Common to both methods is the fact that
they often give a reasonable statistical distribution of the
weather situations over the different stability classes but,
when used in individual situations, they can easily apply to
several classes beside the dispersion situation actually exist-
ing.
These problems imply that in parameter studies one often wishes
to select individual situations that fall outside the allowed
variation areas in the classification schemes. Thus, in chapter
7 the choice falls on category B with a wind speed of 10 m/s.
5.6.1. Deposition
Also what deposition is concerned, there are characteristic
values for the parameters in the different dispersion classes.
In class D precipitation often occurs in connection with longer
periods of rain fronts, while in the unstable classes precipita-
tion is generally of short duration and associated with scattered
showers. In the stable situations the vertical movements in the
atmosphere are strongly suppressed, for which reason the occur-
rence of significant precipitation in classes F and G is very
improbable.
A large deposition velocity implies that a large amount of ma-
terial in the plume is deposited close to the source, which is,
of course, an advantage for areas far from the source. A small
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deposition velocity, on the other hand, results in larger doses
far from the source because the plume can transport the material
released over longer distances without much depletion.
Thus it is impossible in general to give definite, pessimistic
estimates for deposition parameters. However, for a given set
of dispersion parameters, the deposition velocity giving the
greatest contaminated area can be found (Je 80).
This deposition velocity is not, however, always physically re-
alistic because it represents an upper limit to the velocity of
dry deposition given by the product u(u^/u)2 of the square on
the intensity of the turbulence and the wind speed. In class B
the intensity of the turbulence will be typically 0.06 and the
speed 2 m/s, for which reason the dry deposition velocity will
be less than 0.7 cm/s. In class F the intensity of the turbu-
lence is small, less than half of the above; for this reason
the dry deposition velocity will often be less than 0.2 cm/s.
For larger wind velocities these upper bounds on the deposition
velocity increase correspondingly.
In practice, the dry deposition velocities are often signifi-
cantly smaller than the values given above because the surface
is not a perfect absorber but shows a resistance to absorbance
(cf. chapter 4).
The rate of wet deposition is only limited by the intensity of
the precipitation. The greater the intensity, the greater the
wash-out. For a gas, the effect of wash-out depends on the sol-
ubility of the gas in water and a characteristic time for the
dissolution process. En 68 gives the following values for the
wash-out coefficient lg for a very active gas, e.g., bromine:
Intensity of precipitation (mm/h) 0.06
Wash-out coefficient (1/s) x 105 1
Gaseous iodine is less active than bromine, and for free iodine
the deposition parameter is about two orders of magnitude less
than the values shown above. The deposition parameter falls a
further two orders of magnitude for CH3I (Ni 81).
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With regard to the wash-out of particles, the efficiency of the
process depends on particle size and the distribution of the
size of the rain drops. In the calculations, however, use is
made of the same values for the deposition parameter as given
above. This can be justified on the basis of the existence of
an empirical relation between the sizes of rain drops and the
intensity of precipitation, as well as on the fact that all
the relevant particles are about one micrometer in size.
5.6.2. Choice of weather situations for the parameter study
Chapter 7, fig. 7.2, shows the five weather situations selected
for the parameter study. The choice was based partly on the
above considerations and partly on the results published in
He 77. The calculations in chapter 7 show that the most un-
favourable of these situations should be sought within the ex-
tremely stable ones (category F). The present section gives a
discussion of why the most unfavourable weather situation is
characterized by class F with meandering, a wind speed of
around 5 m/s and a dry deposition velocity of between 1 and
2 cm/s.
The calculations in chapter 7 show that the velocity of dry de-
position Vg has much influence on the resulting contamination.
Let ms define a limit value for deposited amount per unit area,
m, under which an area is not considered to be contaminated. If
the deposition velocity is large, the plume is diluted rapidly,
the largest amounts are deposited close to the source and the
distance from the source, where m < ms, is short. In contrast,
if Vg is small, the distance to the point where m < m s will be
large, and the contaminated area will be large. If vg gets very
small, m may not reach the value ms anywhere. Thus it appears
that there must be a value Vgax that gives the greatest con-
taminated area (Roll's theorem).
Applying a number of simplifying assumptions, an expression is
derived in Je 80 for determining the deposition parameter that
gives the greatest contaminated area for a given set of dis-
persion parameters. The deposition parameter d is expressed by:
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Vg
d = _ , (5.7)
au
where a stands for the vertical dispersion angle of the plume,
The determination of i
and u, as well as of:
v™
a x
 requires the specification of mgf a
M the total amount of activity released
H the effective release heightf and
3 the horizontal dispersion angle.
For high wind speeds, H is equal to the physical source height
and for neutral conditions 3 ~ a ~ 1/33, independent of wind
speed. For low wind speeds and stable conditions, H and 3 are,
however, functions of u. Taking plume lift into account and
making use of Brigg's formula, gives H ~ (l/u)0#33f an<3 the in-
vestigation of meandering shows (figs. 5.3 and 5.4) that 3 ~
(l/u)P, where p has a value of around 0.6 to 0.8.
Using the results of Je 80 and Kr 81, connected values for u
and v]?ax in stable weather situations can be found. The result
appears in fig. 5.6. It may be concluded that the determination
of v™ax depends only little on the choice of contamination level,
and moreover that v™ax must be sought among the values usually
used for Vg, i.e. between 0.5 and 2.0 cm/s (although from a phys-
ical point of view these values are rather large). Calculations
and arguments are as follows:
The total amount of activity released, M, is put at
264 MCi, corresponding to a BWR-2 accident.
With regard to the limit value for deposited amount per
unit area, ms, two examples are given: m s = 10""* Ci m""2,
corresponding to approx. 0.7 rem over the first month,
and ms = 4.2 •10"^ Ci m " , corresponding to approx. 30 rem
over the first month. The horizontal dispersion angle 3
of the plume is determined by 3 = tfy/x, where ay is given
by ay =
20 km.
= 5400 x
 u
 0 # 8
 (fig. 5.3) and the distance x is
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u (m/s)
8 10
Fig, 5.6. The curves represent the deposition velocity
vmax that, for a given wind speed, gives the largest
possible contaminated area. The curves are calculated
for a BWR-2 accident under stable conditions taking
into account the meandering effect. The difference be-
tween the two unbroken curves is that the thin line is
calculated for a contamination boundary of 10~4 Ci m""2
(-0.7 rem in the first month) while the thick line is
calculated for 4.2-10"3 Ci m~2 (~ 30 rem in the first
month). Both are calculated for stability F. The dashed
curve is analogous to the thick-line curve with the ex-
ception that stability E is used. The points A repre-
sent the cases used in the preliminary parameter study
(21 situations).
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The vertical dispersion angle a of the plume is put at
1/200, corresponding to class F, and at 1/100, correspond-
ing to class E.
The source height is determined using Brigg's formula (cf.
He 77) for plume lift under stable conditions. Use is made
of H = 2.9 (B/(uS))1/3f where B is a measure of the initial
over-temperature of the plume relative to the surrounding
air, and S is the square of the so-called Brunt-Vaisala
frequency and a measure of the stability of the atmosphere
(the physical source height is neglected in these examples),
If an S is used that corresponds to a temperature gradient
in the atmosphere of 2.75°C per 100 m (stable weather situ-
ation with small to moderate wind speeds) and a B corre-
sponding to a BWR-2 accident, then for u = 1 m/s we find a
source height of 116 m (He 77, table 7). For other wind
speeds, the source height is calculated from H = 116/uV3.
From Je 80 we find:
1 o 1/d a M a2
(e2) m =
 ( 5 # 8 )
dm 2e ms p H2
which can be solved for dm as a function of u. As dm is defined
as v£}ax/(au), it follows that the deposition velocity which, at
a given speed, gives the largest contaminated area can be calcu-
lated. As mentioned earlier, the result is given in fig. 5.6.
In spite of the fact that the right-hand side of the above equa-
tion varies somewhat with variations in 3 and H, and thus with
variations in u, dm varies only from 0.3 to 0.2 when u varies
from 1 m/s to 10 m/s (a = 1/200, ms = 10~4 Ci/m2). Similarly it
can be ascertained that dm is relatively insensitive to varia-
tions in, e.g., ms and a. This shows that v™ax is largely pro-
portional to u. From fig. 5.6 it appears that v™ax correspond-
ing to u = 5 m/s should be set equal to approx. 1 cm/s. Conse-
quently this preliminary study with the dose model made use of
u = 5 m/s and vg = 0.5; 1.0 and 2.0 cm/s as well as a factor of
1.81 (time-averaging) or 4 (meandering) on ay.
- 62 -
Should lower wind speeds be chosen, then v™ax should be decreased
correspondingly. The lower curve on fig. 5.6 largely represents
physically possible deposition velocities, with the exception
perhaps at the low end. This is because Vq will always be less
than u^/u, which can be extraordinarily small under very stable
circumstances (u^ is a characteristic wind speed scale near the
surface of the earth). To stay on the curve in fig. 5.6 at low
wind speeds, i.e. to maximise the contaminated area, it will
therefore be necessary to assume a certain wash-out effect.
Stable weather situations of the type class P with low wind
speeds are found in connection with intense long wave (infrared)
radiation from the surface of the earth, and thus a predominantly
cloudless sky. Therefore it is rather improbable that precipi-
tation would occur under such a weather condition; for this
reason stable weather situations with very low wind speeds will
not be among the most serious in connection with an evaluation
of land contamination.
As to precipitation, it can furthermore be ascertained that
wash-out generally gives too high deposition velocities, far
more than 2 cm/s, for situations with rain to be serious from
the viewpoint of land contamination. The doses resulting from
these situations (which are characterized as class D with rain)
can be high, but they occur within a limited area.
Finally, for neutral and unstable conditions without precipi-
tation the atmospheric dispersion of the plume is too rapid to
give a contaminated area as large as for the class F situation.
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NATURAL REDUCTION OF DOSES
Calculations of the dose rate from activity deposited on sur-
faces make use of a reference dose rate at a distance of 1 m
above an infinite plane smooth surface with uniformly distrib-
uted surface activity. The actual dose rate will always be
smaller than the reference dose rate as a result of different
reduction factors, such as the shielding provided by structures
and vehicles, the routine ploughing of agricultural land, and
the influence of the weather on deposited activity, etc.
This chapter describes how these reduction factors can be eval-
uated and presents the factors that are used in the calculations
in this report. However, it must be emphasized that these reduc-
tion factors do not assume the implementation of any special
measures. Dose reduction that can be achieved by means of
special action, hereunder alterations in the daily life of the
population, are dealt with in chapters 8 and 10.
6.1. Structure shielding
6.1.1. Shielding factor
The shielding factor for a given structure and for a given radi-
ation field is defined as the ratio between the dose rate from
the radiation field with shielding and the dose rate (reference
dose rate) without shielding. In the literature the shielding
factor is also called the transmission factor.
The shielding factor for a given structure is described as the
relation between the dose rate 1 m above the floor inside this
structure - which originates from all sources of activity on
roads, roofs and walls - and the dose rate 1 m above a plane,
infinite, surface source having the same surface concentration:
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6,1.2. Calculated shielding factors for dwellings in
metropolitan Copenhagen
A mathematical model, implemented as a computer program (He
82), was developed to calculate the shielding factors for dif-
ferent types of building. The dose rate inside the structure,
originating from the activity deposited on roofs, walls and
roads, respectively, was calculated by means of numerical inte-
gration over all surface sources. Attenuation and build-up in
air as well as in all the building materials are taken into ac-
count, and the dose rate is given by:
D = const.* I j j .e-Zyt dx^dy
all y x 4irr2
sources
Calculation of the shielding factor necessitates knowledge of
the elemental composition of walls, floors, dividing walls and
roofs to be able to determine the linear attenuation coefficient
y for the materials. The linear attenuation coefficient speci-
fies the shielding ability of a material, as a material thick-
ness of 1/y reduces the primary flux density from the gamma radi-
ation source by 63%.
The report He 80 contains calculations of the shielding factor
for different types of building. These calculations were based
on information given by the National Building Research Institute
regarding the representative dimensions of multistorey buildings
and free-standing houses in the metropolitan area of Copenhagen,
and on assumptions regarding the representative of such buildings
in relation to roads, gardens, etc. Both for free-standing houses
and for multistorey blocks, the moderate shielding afforded by
windows, which are assumed to cover 25% of the area of outer
walls, is taken into account.
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In calculating the shielding factors, it is assumed that the ac-
tivity deposited on the roofs and walls of free-standing houses
and multistorey blocks is ten times less per unit area than on
gardens.
For free-standing houses, the shielding factor is found to be
approximately 0.07, corresponding to a reduction factor of 15 of
the outdoor dose rate from an infinite surface source having the
same deposition as the gardens surrounding the houses. For multi-
storey buildings, the largest reduction is found in the buildings
of greatest height, and here for the appartments on the middle
floors. In this case the outdoor dose rate from an infinite sur-
face source having the same deposition as on houses and roads is
reduced by a factor of up to 100 (shielding factor 0.01). For
smaller buildings, the shielding factor for appartments on the
middle floors is about 0.02, whereas in all cases the apartments
on the bottom and top floors give poorest protection, correspond-
ing to a shielding factor of 0.03-0.05.
In very large buildings, and in windowless cellars, a shielding
factor can be achieved of one or two orders of magnitude less,
i.e., 0.0001-0.005.
Experiments have been carried out in the USA to determine the
shielding factor for houses, primarily for free-standing, one-
storey or two-storey houses (Au 59, Bu 66, Bu 70). In order to
simulate a homogeneously distributed surface source on the
ground and on the roof, use was made of a tube system placed
around the house and on the roof; a relatively strong radioac-
tive source was pumped through the tubing at a constant rate.
Integrating dosimeters were set up in the different rooms in
the house to measure the dose from the rotating source. These
experiments were intended to clarify the shielding effect of
typical American houses in the event of fallout from nuclear
weapons, and to determine whether this effect could be improved
by simple means.
For houses built of brick or concrete blocks, reduction factors
in the range of 5-10 were found away from doors and windows in
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the outer rooms. In inner rooms, reduction factors of 10 to 20
were found (Bu 66). Taking into account the differences between
building traditions and standards in the USA and in Denmark,
there is reasonably good agreement between the experimental re-
sults and the calculations used in the present study.
6.1.3. Weighted and time-averaged shielding factors for homes
in the metropolitan area
For a given distribution of buildings, the weighted shielding
factor can be calculated from:
S = I pi-Si
i
where p^ is the fraction of a given type of building having the
shielding factor S^. The weighted shielding factor expresses
the ratio between the average individual dose rate for the
area under consideration in the case that individuals remain
indoors, and the dose rate for the same area in the case that
individuals remain out of doors on an infinite surface.
Denmark's Bureau of Statistics provided information (DA 77) on
the distribution of homes in the municipalities of the metro-
politan area. Using this distribution and the calculated shield-
ing factors for different types of house, calculations were made
of the weighted shielding factors shown in table 6.1 (He 80).
It should be noted that for the urban municipalities (marked
by *) a reduction of a factor 10 was introduced into the calcu-
lation. This was done to account for the fact that deposition
on hard surfaces (of houses and roads) is a factor 10 less (see
chapter 4) than on the grass-covered surfaces used as reference
for the dose calculations in this report. Technicalities relating
to the calculation procedure necessitated this step because the
present dose calculation model does not take into account any
spatial variation of the deposition velocity. The method used
can only be regarded as an approximation, which in this case is
reasonably good because there is a limited depletion of the plume
as a result of dry deposition within the area subjected to the
major part of the collective dose.
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Table 6.1. Weighted shielding factors for homes in different
municipalities.
Municipality
Copenhagen*
Frederiksberg*
Ballerup
Brondby*
Gentofte
Gladsaxe
Glostrup*
Herlev
Albertslund
Hvidovre
Hoje Tlistrup
Led0Je-Sm0rum
Rodovre
Ish0j
Tarnby
Vallensbaek
Greve
GundS0
K0ge
Rams0
Roskilde*
Solr0d
Shielding factor (%)
0.430
0.359
3.78
0.707
3.68
3.58
0.985
4.64
4.89
3.64
4.67
7.58
3.93
3.61
4.32
5.16
6.46
7.57
5.13
7.59
1.13
6.32
* indicates that the shielding factor includes a factor 10
to correct for the lower deposition velocity in urban
areas (see the text).
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To be able to calculate realistic doses, it is necessary to use
a time-averaged shielding factor that takes into account the
fact that the population is located partly out of doors and
partly indoors in different areas. The time-averaged shielding
factor, which expresses the ratio between the (average individual
or collective) dose over a certain time period for a combination
of indoor and outdoor location and the dose over the same time
period out of doors on an infinite grass field, can be calculated
from:
168
where t^ is the number of hours in a week during which an indi-
vidual is located at the place having the shielding factor S^
(which can either be a weighted shielding factor or a single
shielding factor). Four different locations are considered with
shielding factors and time distribution within one week as
shown in table 6.2.
Table 6.2. Shielding factors for different types of location
Location Percentage of time Semi-urban area Urban area
Out of doors 6.2 0.5 0.05
Transport 5.0 0.5 x 0.5 0.5 * 0.05
Work/school 23.8 0.0015 0.0015
Home 65.0 5house 5town
Both for semi-urban and urban areas, the shielding factors (Al
78) include a factor 0.5 owing to the outdoor shielding effect
of the surrounding buildings, etc. For transport, a further re-
duction of 0.5 is included to account for the shielding effect
of the vehicle itself. An investigation (La 81) carried out af-
ter the completion of the present work shows that this factor
can be justified. As mentioned previously, there is moreover a
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reduction of the shielding factors by a factor 10 in urban areas
to compensate for the lesser deposition on wallsf roofs, asphalt,
etc.
For the shielding factor of places of work, the same value was
selected as for apartments on the second and third floors of
four-storey buildings (0.015), based on the consideration that
factories, public offices, hospitals, colleges, schools, etc.,
are normally larger buildings with thick walls. Further it is
assumed that the deposition on these buildings and their sur-
roundings is a factor 10 less than on grass-covered surfaces,
whether these buildings are in semi-urban or in urban areas.
It is, moreover, assumed that the population of a certain muni-
cipality is employed in this municipality, too. Of course, this
is a simplification but the error is counterbalanced in the sum-
ming of the collective dose for all municipalities. Further the
estimated transport time is relatively large even in the case of
considerable distances between homes and places of work.
Table 6.3 shows the time-averaged shielding factors for muni-
cipalities in the metropolitan area calculated using the above
assumptions (He 80). The table gives the "total" shielding fac-
tors for normal residence, transport and work in the area, as
well as the shielding factors for work and transport in the
municipality, but assuming that non-working hours are spent out-
side the contaminated area.
For the sake of completeness, it should be noted that both the
weighted and the time-averaged shielding factors are calculated
by averaging over the distribution of homes. For this reason
they can only be used to calculate the collective doses and the
average individual doses for the evaluation of stochastic health
effects, but not for calculating individual doses for the as-
sessment of non-stochastic health effects.
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Table 6.3. Time-averaged shielding factors in % for different
municipalities:
Municipality Total Work
Copenhagen*
Frederiksberg*
Ballerup
Brondby*
Gentofte
Gladsaxe
Glostrup*
Herlev
Albertslund
Hvidovre
Hoje T&strup
Ledoje-Smorum
Rodovre
Ishoj
Tarnby
Vallensbaek
Greve
Gundso
K0ge
Rams0
Roskilde*
Solr0d
* see the footnote to table 6.1.
0.75
0.74
6.84
0.93
6.78
6.71
1.11
7.40
7.57
6.75
7.42
9.32
6.94
6.73
7.19
7.74
8.58
9.31
7.72
9.32
1.21
8.49
0.16
0.16
1.29
0.16
1 .29
1.29
0.16
1.29
1.29
1.29
1.29
1.29
1.29
1.29
1.29
1.29
1.29
1.29
1 .29
1.29
0.16
1.29
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6.2. Ploughing
When evaluating the long-term consequences of land contamina-
tion it is necessary to take into account the fact that agri-
cultural areas - no matter whether it is decided to destroy the
crops growing on them during the first year after the accident
or not - will be ploughed up sooner or later. Hence the conta-
mination, if not removed by scraping or other procedures, will
be ploughed down under a shielding layer of soil. The time that
elapses from contamination to ploughing depends, naturally
enough, on the season of the year and on which measures are per-
haps taken. Modern agricultural implements imply, however, that
the actual time spent by workers on the fields is limited, and
if steps are taken to rapidly plough or dig over the areas sur-
rounding the farmhouse and yard, then the time of routine plough-
ing will only be of significance for doses received by road-users
in agricultural areas.
Ro 82 gives further details of the experiments that were car-
ried out at Riso for studying the effect of ploughing, while He
79 describes calculations of shielding factors for ploughing.
The experiments - combined with the calculations - showed that
ploughing reduces the radiation levels on fields by a factor 15-
18. Later ploughing must be expected to reduce this effect, and
in He 79 there are calculations showing that a homogeneous mix-
ing of the activity in the uppermost 25 cm of the soil results
in a reduction factor of 6.
The assumption of homogeneous mixing is, however, cautious - if
the first ploughing is deeper than the subsequent ones, then
the majority of the deposited activity will be retained in the
deep layer.
The effect of ploughing was not taken into account in the dose
calculations.
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6.3. The effect of run-off and of weathering
The deposited activity will vanish more rapidly than is deter-
mined by the physical half-life as a result of the weather and
especially of rain. The run-off effect follows upon precipita-
tion during or in the first couple of days after deposition,
while weathering is a long-term effect.
Wa 82 reports on a number of experiments carried out at Riso
for studying these effects.
A run-off of 10% was measured in one experiment during precipi-
tation. In others there was an effect of the same magnitude
from the first heavy rain after contamination, if this rain oc-
curred reasonably rapidly (within a couple of weeks) after con-
tamination.
These results are in agreement with information given in Ri 76.
Admittedly, a larger immediate run-off effect is stated to oc-
cur here, but this is associated with considerably heavier rain
than is normally experienced in Denmark. In Ri 76 it is stated
that a run-off effect is first manifested after more than 3 mm
of rain have fallen on dry roads: however, if the asphalt al-
ready has a wet surface because of rain that fell earlier, then
an initial run-off can be expected after 1.5 mm of rain.
In a different experiment a run-off of approximately 30% was
measured on ice-covered roads while snow was falling and tem-
peratures were above freezing. As this value includes clearing
of the road by sweeping, etc., it should be possible to use it
to ascertain that the effect is at any rate no less in snow
than in rain.
In the weathering experiments the deposited activity was stud-
ied throughout a period lasting from one to two months. Within
this time it was possible to ascertain that activity disappears
from asphalt surfaces more rapidly than can be accounted for by
the physical half-life.
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By taking a simple average, weathering was found to give a half-
life of 27 days in the initial period; hereafter activity van-
ishes with a half-life that is very close to the physical half-
life.
In Ga 63f Gale reports a measured weathering half-life for agri-
cultural land of approximately one year. It seems reasonable
that activity vanishes more rapidly from an asphalt surface
than the time it takes to penetrate into the soil.
Using a 27-day half-life for weathering and otherwise Gale's
half-life of approximately 100 years for the long-term effect,
then the disappearance of Cs activity from asphalt surfaces can
be described by the reduction factor (Wa 82):
V(t) = 0.6*exp(-9.5 t) + 0.4 exp(-0.0075 t)
where t is given in years. This reduction factor is used both
for asphalt roads and for the surfaces of structures in the dose
calculations presented in this report.
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7. DOSES AND CONTAMINATION IF NO COUNTERMEASURES ARE
IMPLEMENTED
7.1* Introduction
This chapter presents an evaluation of the maximum contamination
levels, and the doses originating from these, that could be ex-
pected on Danish territory should there occur a release of radio-
activity at Barseback, and provided that no special measures are
taken except to warn the population to stay indoors with windows
and doors closed during the passage of the cloud.
Calculations were made for situations comprising a core melt-
down, containment failure, and wind direction towards Copenhagen.
Applying these assumptions, the consequences were evaluated
partly under the most probable circumstances (BWR-3 release,
Pasquill stability category D without rain and a wind speed of
10 m/s) - in the following called "the BWR-3 case" - and partly
under extremely unfortunate and extremely improbable circum-
stances (BWR-2 release, Pasquill stability category F with me-
andering and without rain and with a wind speed of 5 m/s) - in
the following called "the BWR-2 case".
Doses and contamination levels were calculated by means of Riso's
consequence calculation model, PLUCON 2, which is based on the
Gaussian dispersion model. This is discussed in greater detail
in chapter 5, which also deals with the meteorological assump-
tions for the calculations. A detailed description of the model
is given in Th 80.
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7.2. General calculation assumptions
The assumptions for the calculations are described in greater
detail in chapters 3f 4f 5 and 6. A summary of some of the most
important of these is given here.
7.2.1. Geography
It was decided to consider only the wind direction that is most
unfavourable with respect to the collective doses, i.e., that
in the direction toward 249° (WSW, north = 360°).
The area for which detailed calculations were made of external
gamma doses from deposited radioactivity is, as shown in fig.
7.1, the distance interval 20-55 km from Barseback and the
angle interval 234° to 264°, as well as the distance interval
55 to 80 km from Barseback and the angle interval 239° to 259°.
As shown on the figure, this area is divided up into 90 sectors,
the central part of the area being divided into smaller sectors
than the outer. The population density is given in fig. 7.2.
7.2.2. Deposition velocity
As discussed at greater length in chapter 4, it is assumed
cautiously that the deposition velocity is 0.2 cm»s~"1 for all
smooth surfaces (roofs, walls and roads) but 2 cm#s"^ for
fields, gardens, etc.
Because of calculation technicalities the deposition velocity
was put at 2 cm*s"^ overall, but the lesser velocity in urban
areas is accounted for by multiplying by a factor 0.1 the shield-
ing factors for the municipalities concerned. The acceptability
of this step is discussed in more detail in chapter 6.
7.2.3. Weathering and ploughing
A correction was made for the weathering of surface deposition
using a factor
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0.6-e"9-5>t + 0.4*e-°*0075t>t (t in years)
in the area ranging from 20 to 80 km from Barseback. This factor
is based on the experiments described in section 6.
Ploughing is not taken into account.
7.2.4. Shielding factors for normal residence and work
Here the shielding factor is defined as the ratio between the
dose rate at a given point and the dose rate 1 meter above a
grass field of infinite extent.
The weighted shielding factors for homes are calculated using
the Bureau of Statistics1 distribution of these in 22 munici-
palities (see chapter 6). Time-averaged shielding factors are
calculated using the following distribution of the time spent
in various activities:
time spent:
•
•
•
•
•
•
out of doors
in transport
at work
inside the home
6.2%
5.0%
23.8%
65.0%
As mentioned in 7.2.2, a factor 0.1 is introduced into the cal-
culation of shielding factors for municipalities of urban charac-
ter to take into account the lesser deposition velocity.
Based on an estimate of the distribution of the area of the 22
municipalities over the 70 sectors, the time-averaged shielding
factors for these sectors are calculated by means of a simple
area weighting of municipality shielding factors (see table
6.3).
For distances of more than 55 km, a constant shielding factor
of 0.077 for "normal" residence and of 0.013 for work including
transport are included in the calculations.
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Table 7.1 shows for each sector the "total" time-averaged shield-
ing factors for normal residence, transport and work in the sec-
tor concerned, as well as the time-averaged shielding factors
for work and transport in the sector concerned (but assuming
that non-working hours are spent outside the contaminated area).
Table 7.1. Time-averaged shielding factors (%)
Sector
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
"Total"
3.46
0.75
0.75
0.75
0.74
0.71
0.75
0.75
0.75
2.68
4.40
1.68
1.80
1.66
1.95
1.82
1.95
2.55
1 .95
0.75
6.69
4.15
4.47
2.98
1.84
2.39
4.42
5.30
6.75
6.75
8.31
7.53
7.53
6.88
6.23
Work and
transport
0.67
0.16
0.16
0.16
0.16
0.16
0.16
0.16
0.16
0.50
0.84
0.33
0.35
0.33
0.39
0.36
0.39
0.50
0.39
0.16
1.20
0.72
0.78
0.52
0.33
0.44
0.84
1.00
1.30
1.30
1.30
1.30
1 .30
1.20
1 .10
Sector
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71-90
"Total"
6.26
6.16
6.82
-
—
8.84
7.42
7.42
7.42
7.04
7.47
8.40
8.58
8.58
—
9.31
6.96
6.18
2.14
7.10
6.74
8.58
8.56
8.53
8.49
5.66
1 .21
1.21
1.21
1.57
7.03
9.23
8.62
8.49
7.99
7.70
Work and
transport
1 .10
1.10
1 .20
-
—
1.30
1 .30
1.30
1 .30
1.30
1.30
1.30
1.30
1.30
—
1.30
1 .10
1 .10
0.33
1.20
1 .00
1 .30
1 .30
1.30
1.30
0.78
0.16
0.16
0.16
0.22
1 .00
1.30
1 .30
1.30
1.30
1.30
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The shielding factors shown in table 7.1 are used for calculation
of the individual and population doses forf respectively, "nor-
mal" residence and work/transport alone. "Normal" residence is
here understood as a lifestyle without alteration in the usual
pattern of time spent out of doors/indoors, in transport and at
work (the reference situation).
7.3. The "most probable" accident circumstances
WASH-1400 (NRC 77) gives the following probabilities for the
three types of release that comprise both a core melt-down and
containment failure:
BWR-1 1 x 10~6 per reactor year
BWR-2 6 x 10""6 per reactor year
BWR-3 2 x 10~5 per reactor year
As stated in chapter 3, recent investigations have shown, how-
ever, that the BWR-1 release is of much less probability than
that given in WASH-1400.
The BWR-3 release is the most probable of these hypothetical re-
leases (which, in fact, have never occurred).
As discussed in chapter 5, the most probable meteorological con-
ditions in Denmark comprise a Pasquill category D situation
without precipitation and with a wind speed of 10 nfs~1.
The first type of accident (the "BWR-3 case") can therefore be
defined as follows:
Type of release BWR-3
Duration of release 3 hours
Thermal release 5.9 MW
Release height 0 m
Stability Pasquill D, without precipitation
Wind speed 10 m*s~1
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7.4. "Worst" accident circumstances
As discussed at greater length in chapter 3, a BWR-2 release is
considered the type of release that, in the case of a boiling-
water reactor, could give rise to the worst contamination con-
sequences.
In chapter 5 there are descriptions of the weather situations
that could be unfavourable for Danish territory in the event of
a large-scale accident at the Barseback plant.
These are situations where there is relatively large dry deposi-
tion (Vg = 2 cm/s on rough surfaces), such as it appears from
the following table:
Situation
no.
1
2
3
4
5
Name
B, dry
D, dry
D, rain [75%
run-off]
F, dry
F, meander
[factor 4]
Atmospheric
stability
(Pasquill)
B
D
D
F
F
Wind
speed
[m/s]
10
10
10
5
5
Wet deposition
parameter
0
0
5«10~5
0
0
Dry deposition
parameter [cm/s]
on rough surfaces
2
2
2
2
2
To determine which of these situations is/are the most unfavour-
able for Danish territory, comparative calculations of the fol-
lowing factors were made:
a. Area inside the isodose curves
b. Number of people subject to given dose
c. Collective doses in given individual dose intervals
d. Area inside isoconcentration curves for caesium-137.
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When evaluating the various situations, consideration is given
to individual and collective doses from external gamma radiation
originating from deposited radioactivity integrated over 30 years
from the start of the accident. It must be noted that the choice
of integration period and shielding factors for buildings and
the like is of no importance for the relative assessment of the
different combinations of parameters. The relative variation of
the dose rate with time (i.e., dose rate at the time t in rela-
tion to the dose rate 24 hours after the start of the accident)
depends only on the isotopic composition of the releases.
The results of this parameter study are shown on figs. 7.3-7.6.
Regardless of which of the above criteria is applied, the figures
show that situation no. 5 represents the most unfavourable cir-
cumstances.
The second type of accident (the BWR-2 case) can therefore be
defined as follows:
Type of release BWR-2
Duration of release 3 hours
Thermal release 9 MW
Height of release 0 m
Stability Pasquill F
Meandering factor 4
Wind speed 5 m»s~1
To investigate whether under these accident circumstances non-
stochastic health effects would occur in connection with the
passage of the cloud, calculations were made of external gamma
doses from the cloud, inhalation doses to the bone marrow (inte-
grated over 30 days after inhalation) and effective dose equiv-
alent from inhalation (integrated over 50 years after inhala-
tion) .
A location indoors is assumed throughout the passage of the cloud,
A shielding factor of 0.6 was used for the external gamma doses
from the cloud (NRC 75). The inhalation doses are reduced by a
factor 0.2 to take into account the filter effect of buildings.
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1: Pasquill B , dry
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Fig, 7«5. BWR-2 parameter study:
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Fig. 7.6. BWR-2 parameter study:
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The results are shown in fig. 7.7. The maximum individual dose
to bone marrow at distances more than 20 km from Barseback is
seen to be 30 rem, which is far below the doses that give rise
to non-stochastic health effects.
7.5. Doses under the "most probable" accident circumstances
Applying the assumptions mentioned in 7.2 and 7.3f the following
individual doses are calculated from deposited activity in the
BWR-3 case, assuming people pursuing normal activities.
Fig. 7.8. Individual doses in the first month
Fig. 7.9. Individual doses in the second month
Fig. 7.10. Individual doses in 30 years.
The isodose curves for people pursuing normal activities (indi-
vidual doses integrated over 30 years) are found to have the
following approximate dimensions:
Dose Area [km2]
5 rem 326
10 rem 67
The collective doses over 30 years for the area ranging up to
110 km from Barseback are calculated to 3.6 Megamanrem.
7.6. Doses under the "worst" accident circumstances
Applying the assumptions given in 7.2 and 7.4, the following
individual doses were calculated for the BWR-2 case:
Fig. 7.11. Individual doses in the first month
Fig. 7.12. Individual doses in the second month
Fig. 7.13. Individual doses in the third month
Fig. 7.14. Individual doses in 30 years.
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Isodose curves applying to those pursuing normal activities
(individual doses integrated over 30 years) are found to be of
the following approximate dimensions:
Dose Area [km2]
5 rem
30 rem
100 rem
2000
475
55
The collective doses over thirty years for the area up to 110
km from Barseback are calculated to 41 Megamanrem.
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8. DOSE-REDUCING MEASURES RELATING TO SURFACE CONTAMINATION
8,1. Introduction
This chapter is an assessment of the decontamination measures
that could be appropriate in the two types of accident described
in chapter 7.
Different decontamination methods are discussed and their ef-
ficiency describedf partly on the basis of experimental and
theoretical studies carried out at Riso during the last couple
of years. The influence on dose levels - particularly the doses
in the BWR-2 case - is evaluated through calculating doses as-
sociated with single measures and with a combination of these.
The measures to be implemented after a given accident must
firstly be justifiable - i.e., the costs associated with the
decontamination measures, hereunder radiation doses to decon-
tamination workers, must be less than the value of the dose re-
duction achieved through the implementation of such measures.
Secondly, such a measure should only continue until the costs
of the most recent part-measure (e.g., the last of a series of
fire-hosing procedures) exceeds the value of the associated
dose reduction.
The principles given above naturally presuppose that only stoch-
astic health effects are possible in the area in question. As
shown in chapter 7, this would be the case throughout all Danish
territory even under the most extreme accident circumstances.
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8,2. Decontamination processes and their efficiency
8.2.1. Decontamination of hard surfaces
There is much information concerning the decontamination of
surfaces (Wi 65, Wi 66, Cl 63), but the great majority of the
data concern decontamination associated with fallout resulting
from the explosion of nuclear weapons near the area under con-
sideration.
For surfaces, the possibilities of decontamination depend heavi-
ly on the character of the surfaces, e.g., roughness, porosity
and chemical properties, as also on the size of the deposited
particles. Fallout particles close to the site of a nuclear ex-
plosion are relatively large, i.e., greater than 20 ym, while
the particles from a core-melt accident are assumed to be less
than 4 ym in size. For this reason the results found for the
decontamination of radioactive particles originating from nuclear
weapon explosions cannot be used as a direct measure for the de-
contamination that could be obtained for particles deposited as
a result of a core-melt accident.
The adhesion of radioactive contamination depends on whether
the particles are deposited with rain, or whether they are de-
posited in dry weather. Moreover, the result of decontamination
depends strongly on how rapidly such a process can be carried
out. This applies in particular to dry deposition, as rain will
carry the radioactive material down into pores and cracks, re-
sulting in a stronger adhesion that makes decontamination proce-
dures difficult.
In addition to the measurements of large fallout particles
(which are not relevant in the present connection), a series of
decontamination experiments have been reported in which the par-
ticle size does correspond to the size that can be expected
from a core melt-down (Di 61). Plutonium having a mean diameter
of approximately 0.8 ym was used for this work.
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8.2.1.1. Hosing, washing and sand blasting, Riso carried out a
series of decontamination experiments using high-pressure hosing
after a simulated deposition of radioactivity on an asphalt
road.
With respect to caesium, the experiments showed that - depending
on the length of time elapsing from deposition to hosing - be-
tween 40% and 5% of the material can be removed. If hosing starts
relatively rapidly after deposition, about 40% can be removed
but after roughly six weeks only about 5% of the remaining ac-
tivity can be dislodged by high-pressure hosing (Wa 82).
In addition, Riso carried out a number of decontamination stud-
ies relating to roofing materials and the walls of structures.
Here, measurements (Ro 81) showed that caesium-137 adheres par-
ticularly strongly when some time has passed since deposition;
moreover, it was possible to conclude that the portion that
vanishes from the surface does so in fact quite rapidly. There-
fore no significant reduction of the radiation level can be
presumed after the first shower of rain following on dry de-
position. This finding agrees with the results of the decontami-
nation studies relating to roads discussed above.
8.2.1.2. Vacuum-sweeping and vacuum cleaning. If roads, pave-
ments, etc., are contaminated by dry deposition, vacuum-sweeping
can remove about two-thirds of the deposited materials (Di 61).
A further high-pressure hosing would give a total decontamina-
tion factor of more than 10, i.e., more than 90% of the radio-
active material would be removed (Di 61).
Should there be a light shower of rain before decontamination
measures are initiated, the situation deteriorates as a large
part of the radioactive material would then adhere far harder
to the underlying surface. Under these circumstances vacuum-
sweeping would hardly have any effect.
Vacuum cleaning of the walls of single-family houses and their
roofs, too, if possible, using an ordinary household vacuum
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cleaner would be a practicable measure in semi-urban areas: the
refuse could be buried in gardens. However, no attempts should
be made to wash down the walls because this leads easily to
even greater adhesion of the radioactivity. Instead, high-pres-
sure hosing could be carried out.
Vacuum cleaning can remove between a third and two-thirds of
the radioactive material. A subsequent pressure hosing should
be able to give a total decontamination factor in excess of 10f
i.e., more than 90% of the radioactive material could be removed
(Cl 63) .
8.2.1.3. The laying and removal of asphalt. The application of
an extra layer of asphalt (approx. 10 cm) on road surfaces is
able to reduce the dose rate from gamma radiation originating
from the road by a factor of approximately 5 at street level
(He 79)f corresponding to an 80% reduction of the activity. If
the asphalt is entirely removed, corresponding to a 100% re-
moval of activity, then the dose rate is further reduced, but
this could hardly be done in the short term.
A practicable and effective dose-reducing measure is to turn
over paving stones, which then act as shielding (a reduction in
dose rate of 3-5 at street level).
8.2.2. Decontamination of ground surfaces
8.2.2.1. Digging gardens in semi-urban areas. The dry deposition
velocity applicable to gardens is assumed to be significantly
greater than that to the surfaces of structures and the surround-
ing streets. In the calculations in this report the deposition
velocity applicable to gardens is fixed at 2 cm/s, but 0.2 cm/s
for structure surfaces and roads. This implies that the calcu-
lated dose rate for those living in semi-urban areas is dominated
by radiation from the grounds surrounding houses. The most ef-
ficient dose-reducing measures that can be applied in these areas
is therefore to reduce the radiation from the ground - either by
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removing the uppermost layer of soil or by digging the activity
into the soil.
If it is assumed that the activity can be buried effectively at
a depth of one spitf and that paving stones can be turned over,
the dose rate from activity on the ground will be reduced by a
factor of approximately 6, corresponding to an activity reduc-
tion of 83%.
If, instead, grass turf and the uppermost layer of soil uncovered
by grass are removed, the dose rate from the surroundings of
houses in semi-urban areas could be reduced by almost 100%. This
procedure does necessitate, however, the provision of dumps for
relatively large amounts of soil and turf, etc. Nevertheless, a
significant dose reduction could be achieved just by placing
this surface material in heaps in corners of gardens - perhaps
covered by a layer of uncontaminated soil.
8.2.2.2. Ploughing of agricultural areas. The dose rate applic-
able to residents in agricultural areas contaminated by dry de-
position, or those who travel around in such areas, is dominated
by the activity deposited on field and soil surfaces.
An effective reduction of the external dose rate can therefore
be achieved by ploughing this activity down under the soil sur-
face. Riso made a number of ploughing experiments in which dif-
ferent areas were contaminated by radioactivity and then
ploughed. Dose rate measurements made before and after plough-
ing combined with the results from a calculation model show
that reduction factors of 15-18 can be obtained for the dose
rate from activity deposited on the ground as a result of nor-
mal ploughing (He 79, Ro 82).
Deep ploughing, in which the uppermost layer of soil is turned
into the bottom of the plough furrow, can reduce the dose rate
from activity deposited on fields 50 to 100 times (Ro 82).
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8.3. Dose reduction brought about by different clean-up measures
8.3.1. Calculation method
For the calculation of the doses presented in chapter 7, use was
made of a shielding factor that accounts for the circumstance
that part of the gamma radiation level from activity deposited
on roads, walls and roofs is absorbed by the building materials,
which thus reduces the radiation dose rate indoors in relation
to the dose rate out of doors.
In chapter 6 the shielding factor S is defined as:
. . .
i Droad+E>wall+Droof
S =
where D r o aa, D w a n and Droof is the dose rate inside the house
concerned resulting from the activity deposited onf respective-
ly
 f roads (gardens), walls and roofsf and D(°°) is the dose rate
1 metre above a grass field of infinite extent. Included in the
calculations of the individual components Droa(g , D w a n , and
Droof ^s t h e c o n c e n t r a t i ° n o f activity per m z surface on, re-
spectively, roads, walls and roofs (He 82). The effect of a
given dose-reducing measure can therefore be expressed by a
modified shielding factor, which is calculated using the con-
centration of activity that would remain on the different sur-
faces after the implementation of the measure.
Calling the shielding factor for the reference situation (see
chapter 7) Sref, and the modified shielding factor after a dose-
reducing measure Sredr then the dose reduction obtainable for a
given area as a result of the dose-reducing measure is Sref/Srec3
> 1. The doses presented in this chapter and in chapter 9 are
calculated according to this principle. The calculation proce-
dure is as follows. The doses from activity deposited on a grass
field of infinite extent are multiplied by the modified shield-
ing factor giving the doses after the dose-reducing measure.
The modified shielding factors are shown in table 8.1.
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8.3.2. Relocation
As an example, the effect was investigated of relocating the
population from areas where the average individual dose for a
given month exceeds, respectively, 3 and 10 rem.
For the BWR-3 case, the calculations in chapter 7 show that
there would be no area in Denmark where the average individual
dose exceeded 3 rem in any month after the accident.
For the BWR-2 case, the two relocation criteria concerned would
imply the relocation of, respectively, some 600 000 and 100 000
people for the first month following upon the accident.
The relocation of people in accordance with the 10 rem and 3 rem
criteria will reduce the collective doses by approximately 1 Mega-
manrem and 4 Megamanrem, respectively.
In relation to the total 30-year collective dose, relocation of
the population from the contaminated areas appears to have only
a marginal effect. This is seen, likewise, from the following
temporal distribution of the total 30-year collective dose with-
out the application of dose-reducing measures:
Period:
1st month
2nd
3rd
4th-360th month
Collective dose
4.7 Megamanrem
1.1
0.6
33
Nevertheless, it is not reasonable to conclude on these grounds
alone that relocation is an unrealistic measure - the assess-
ment should be made on the basis of the costs involved in the
relocation.
8.3.3. Hosing of roads and walls of structures
In urban areas such as Copenhagen the accumulated radiation
dose would be dominated by radiation from activity deposited on
the walls and roofs of structures.
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Assuming that fire-hosing of the roads in the urban areas of
the region concerned (see chapter 7) is initiated rapidlyf so
that 40% of the activity is removed, the accumulated individual
dose in the decontaminated areas would be reduced by approxi-
mately 20%. The doses in the BWR-2 case would then be reduced
by a total of approximately 1.3 Mmanrem.
Furthermore, if it proved possible to fire-hose walls and roofs
of buildings in urban areas, so that 10% of the activity was
removed, then the above dose reduction would be increased to a
total of approximately 2 Mmanrem.
These dose reductions are calculated under the assumption that
the hosing operation would be completed within 14 days - in the
3rd and 4th week after the accident. The reduction would be less
if hosing is carried out at a later date.
8.3.4. Removal of asphalt
In urban areas a long-term measure would be to replace paving
stones and asphalt surfaces on roads, open spaces, etc. Assum-
ing this to be accomplished in urban areas over a period of
four months immediately following the accident in the BWR-2
case, it would imply a dose reduction totalling approximately
3 Mmanrem.
Instead, an approximately 20% smaller dose reduction (2.4
Mmanrem) can be obtained by turning over paving stones and ap-
plying a new, 10 cm thick layer of asphalt on top of old sur-
faces.
8.3.5. Digging of gardens
As mentioned earlier, the dose rate in semi-urban areas would
be dominated by the activity deposited on the ground. Burying
this activity would thus give a substantial dose reduction.
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In calculating the shielding factors for free-standing houses,
it is assumed that a garden of a house is 700 m 2 in size. The
time needed to dig over this area effectively would depend on
the season of the year, but 14 man-days are assumed to be a
realistic estimate.
If digging starts one month after the accident, this work would
imply a dose of approximately 6 manrem per garden in the most
highly contaminated area after the accident in the BWR-2 case.
The total dose reduction in the whole area concerned would then
be approximately 20 Megamanrem.
A dose reduction some 10% greater can be obtained by removing
instead the turf from lawns and the uppermost layer of soil un-
covered by grass.
8.4. Dose reduction through a combination of relocation,
hosing of roads and digging of gardens
8.4.1. Radiation doses to the population
Based on the above considerations, this section establishes the
effect of a combination of measures as follows:
- relocation of the population from areas so long as the
monthly dose exceeds 10 rem
- decontamination taking place during the 3rd and 4th
week following the accident in the areas where the
population has been relocated
- decontamination taking place during the first two months
following the accident in other areas where the doses
exceed 0.25 rem in the second month after the accident
- decontamination comprising fire-hosing of roads etc.,
in urban areas, and digging over the gardens in semi-
urban areas.
- 112
Table 8.1. Modified shielding factors in % after fire-hosing
of roads in urban areas and digging over the gardens of houses
in semi-urban areas
Municipality
Copenhagen*
Frederiksberg*
Ballerup
Brondby*
Gentofte
Gladsaxe
Glostrup*
Herlev
Albertslund
Hvidovre
Hoje Tastrup
Ledoje-Smorum
Rodovre
Ishoj
Tarnby
Vallensbaek
Greve
Gundso
Koge
Ramso
Roskilde*
Solr0d
Shielding factors relative
on a grass field
Home
0.395
0.333
1.300
0.638
1.270
1 .240
0.883
1.580
1.680
1.260
1.600
2.540
1 .350
1 .260
1.480
1 .750
2.180
2.530
1 .740
2.540
1.010
2.130
Work
0.150
0.150
0.150
0.150
0.150
0.150
0.150
0.150
0.150
0.150
0.150
0.150
0.150
0.150
0.150
0.150
0.150
0.150
0.150
0.150
0.150
0.150
to a location
Transport Out of doors
1.90
1.90
4.17
1.90
4.17
4.17
1.90
4.17
4.17
4.17
4.17
4.17
4.17
4.17
4.17
4.17
4.17
4.17
4.17
4.17
1.90
4.17
3.80
3.80
8.33
3.80
8.33
8.33
3.80
8.33
8.33
8.33
8.33
8.33
8.33
8.33
8.33
8.33
8.33
8.33
8.33
8.33
3.80
8.33
Total
0.623
0.583
1.610
0.781
1.590
1.570
0.940
1.790
1.850
1.580
1.800
2.410
1.640
1.580
1.720
1.900
2.180
2.410
1.890
2.410
1.020
2.150
*)Reckoned as urban areas, cf. note to table 6.1.
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Table 8.1 shows the modified shielding factors that take into
account the effect of these decontamination measures.
When calculating population doses in the non-relocated areas,
which are assumed to be decontaminated over two months, use is
made of the shielding factors for the reference situation (cf.
chapter 7) in the first month and thereafter of the shielding
factors from table 8.1. The effect of the measure is thus in-
troduced instantaneously in the middle of the time interval -
which is done because of calculation technicalities.
Figure 8.1 shows the modified shielding factors for the indi-
vidual sectors undergoing the clean-up. These shielding factors
are obtained by distributing the shielding factors for the muni-
cipalities by simple area weighting.
Figure 8.2 shows the sectors where individual doses during the
first month exceed 10 rem in the BWR-2 case. It is proposed
that the population in these sectors is relocated during the
first month. The sectors cover some 80 km2. It seems fairly re-
alistic to envisage that roads and pavements would be fire-hosed
and gardens dug over in these areas during the 3rd and 4th week
following the accident. As appears from the following, this im-
plies that in no area would the individual doses exceed 3 rem
in the second month. In the whole area where doses exceed 0.25
rem in the second month, it is assumed, as earlier stated, that
measures are carried out during the first two months after the
accident.
Individual doses would not exceed 3 rem/month in any area in the
BWR-3 case. This implies that no relocation is foreseen and that
other measures are only carried out during the first two months
in the area where individual doses exceed 0.25 rem in the second
month.
Sectors with an original shielding factor out of doors of less
than 0.20 are here defined as urban areas. Figures 8.3 and 8.4
show the areas thatf applying this definition, should be hosed
and dug over in the BWR-2 and BWR-3 casesf respectively. Natural-
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ly this is a simplified conception. In reality, the areas would
be far more differentiated, but the total result is assumed to
be largely similar.
Figures 8.5, 8.6, 8.7, and 8.8 show the reduced individual doses
obtained in, respectively, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd month, and in a
period of thirty years following the accident in the BWR-2 case.
The total collective dose over 30 years in the area ranging up
to 110 km from Barseback amounts to approximately 18 Mmanrem.
As mentioned in 8.3.2, this dose can be reduced to about 15
Mmanrem if the population is relocated from areas so long as
the individual dose here exceeds 3 rem per month.
8.4.2. Radiation doses to decontamination workers
It is necessary to know the dose rate out of doors as a func-
tion of time in order to calculate the doses received by de-
contamination workers. Figure 8.9 shows this dose rate for the
BWR-2 case in the different sectors at t = 1 day after the ac-
cident. The shielding provided by the surrounding buildings as
well as the lesser deposition on hard surfaces (buildings and
roads) are taken into account. Figure 8.10 shows the relative
dose rate from deposited activity after the accident in the
BWR-2 case. Figure 8.12 shows the dose rates in the sectors at
t = 14 days after the accident.
Calling the dose rate D(t) [rem^d"1], the time for the initia-
tion of decontamination procedures Te, and the time for the
termination of decontamination T, both measured in relation to
1 day after the accident, the accumulated dose for a person
working eight hours a day in the period from T e to T is the fol-
lowing:
T
D(Te,T) = ] / D(t)dt [rem]
Te
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Figure 8.11 shows D(Te,T) as function of T for the BWR-2 case
and different values of Te. D(t) is here the relative dose rate
from fig. 8.10 which is fitted to a sixth-degree logarithmic
polynomial in these calculations. The absolute value of D(TefT)
for the areas in question is obtained through multiplication by
the values shown in fig.8.9.
8.4.2.1. Collective dose from road hosing. According to the
Civil Defence authorities, a group of ten men can hose 0.8 km
of road during an eight-hour working day. The hosing of L km
roads during, respectively, 14 and 60 days requires:
14 days: 0.89*L [workers]
60 days: 0.21*L [workers]
According to fig. 8.11f the following accumulated doses (rela-
tive) are obtained for uninterrupted location throughout, re-
spectively , 14 and 60 days:
D(Te = 14df T = 14d + 14d) = 1.1
D(Te = 14d, T = 14d + 60d) = 2.7 .
Calling the dose rate at t = 1 d, D1d [rem*d~1], the collective
dose for hosing 1 km of road for the two time intervals is then:
ZD = 0.98-D-ia [manrem/km]
for hosing taking 14 days, and
ZD = 0.57-Dia [manrem/km]
for hosing taking 60 days.
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Table 8.2 shows the collective doses per km road for the areas
where hosing - cf. fig. 8.3 - is carried out. It is here as-
sumed that the hosing of the entire area in question is carried
out from t = 14 d to t = 28 d. If the hosing is carried out
over a longer period of time, the collective dose is smaller.
The length of the road system in the areas to be hosed was cal-
culated on the basis of data from the Danish Statistical Year-
book for 1980, combined with an assumption that the roads are
uniformly distributed over the area of the municipalities.
There is a total of 1400 km road in the areas affected. The
total collective dose to the workers doing the hosing, based on
the data in table 8.2, is found to be approximately 3000 manrem,
It should be noted that the calculations do not take into ac-
count the fact that the dose rate gradually falls as decontami-
nation progresses.
8.4.2.2. Collective doses from digging the gardens of houses in
residential areas. It is assumed that it takes 14 man-days to
dig one plot of 700 m2 in size - that used in these calcula-
tions. It is further assumed that the majority of these plots
are dug in the 5th and 6th week following the accident, which
interval of time is considered representative of the entire
semi-urban area.
According to fig. 8.11, the following accumulated relative dose
is obtained:
D(Te = 28d, T = 42d) = 0.63
The collective dose from digging the gardens can then be calcu-
lated from:
ED = D = 0.63#D-|d [manrem/garden ]
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Table 8.2. Collective doses [manrem] for decontamination in the
BWR-2 case, cf. fig. 8.3
Sector
no.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
Number
of
gardens
2090
385
3421
4359
1687
1770
1695
2119
2826
5651
2345
1636
1636
1445
1277
1338
1216
1138
1295
934
934
934
1043
Collective doses
Digging
1517
204
2172
2768
2398
4817
7432
7689
7264
3759
1064
2968
5689
6991
6951
7688
5516
3613
411
1271
2401
3813
5362
Hosing
per km road
0.78
1.39
2.05
2.59
2.59
2.05
1.39
0.78
1.27
2.59
3.53
4.94
4.70
4.23
3.76
1 .51
4.23
3f06
4.47
Sector
no.
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
Number
of
gardens
1122
1109
1106
1106
856
733
835
157
1023
927
1236
1203
1128
2141
520
641
518
1067
1183
1695
3271
807
852
1508
420
813
1320
1721
696
982
191
1041
831
298
313
574
208
215
215
4559
Collective doses
Digging Hosing
per km road
5768
4527
2843
1505
194
621
1389
116
4022
2943
3925
2365
1109
486
46
0.40
0.71
1551
1331
1613
894
256
1381
864
912
637
90
456
740
369
79
297
58
118
58
60
63
40
12
35
35
253
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Table 8,2 shows the distribution of free-standing houses in the
semi-urban area. The distribution is based on a survey made by
the Bureau of Statistics of free-standing houses in municipali-
ties of the metropolitan area, as well as on the distribution
of the area of the municipalities over the different sectors.
If the number of houses inside a given sector is multiplied by
the dose given above for the digging of one garden, then the
collective dose for the whole of the area in question is ob-
tained. Table 8.2 shows the distribution of collective doses
over the individual sectors. Once again, the fact that dose
rate gradually decreases as decontamination progresses is not
taken into account. The total collective dose from digging
about 100 000 gardens surrounding houses is approximately
140 000 manrem.
8.5. Costs
The plans for and the costs associated with a population re-
location were prepared by the Civil Defence authorities for
Greater Copenhagen. The costs are about 450 000 Danish kroner
per 1000 persons. For billeting, a further approximately 80 000
kroner per 1000 persons is needed for a one-week period.
The manpower required to hose 1400 km of road is approximately
17 000 man-days of 8 hours.
The manpower necessary for digging the gardens is estimated to
be some 1 million man-days of 8 hours.
8.6. Conclusion
Based on Riso's experimental and theoretical investigations re-
garding different dose-reducing measures, it can be concluded
that it would hardly be possible with reasonable efforts to re-
duce the external radiation doses from deposited activity by
more than a factor 2-5. WASH-1400 gives reduction factors of
10-20.
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In the BWR-2 case, the collective dose on Danish territory
over the following 30 years could amount to approximately 41
Mmanrem if no dose-reducing measures are carried out. A com-
bined hosing of roads in urban areas, digging of gardens, and
a temporary relocation of the population for one month from
areas where the first month dose exceeds 10 rem, reduces the
collective dose to about 18 Mmanrem. The collective dose to
decontamination workers would total approximately 0.1-0.2
Mmanrem. After decontamination, the average individual dose in
the most heavily contaminated sector would not exceed approxi-
mately 30 rem over the 30 years following the accident.
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9. INDIVIDUAL DOSES FROM WORK CARRIED OUT IN THE
CONTAMINATED AREA
9>1. Introduction
Perhaps the contamination after a core-melt accident would be
so serious that businesses, schools, institutions, etc., would
have to be closed for a shorter or longer period of time. Be-
cause of the better shielding generally provided by the struc-
tures housing such institutions, those that might have to be
closed would be in areas where the residential population had
been relocated. For this reason, a calculation was made of the
doses that people would receive if spending their non-working
hours outside the contaminated area, but working a 40-hour
week in a certain sector; transport to and from work is assumed
to take place in the same sector. Furthermore, an evaluation
was made of the effect that the combination of decontamination
measures (cf. section 8.4) would have on the individual doses
from work and transport in these sectors.
While the individual would find it a great nuisance to be re-
located from home for a short period of time, for society as a
whole this intervention would have reasonable consequences. On
the other hand, it is of great importance for society to keep
places of work in operation, whether these be private businesses,
or public offices and institutions. Thus it is obvious that the
criteria applicable to the relocation of residential areas
should be far stricter than those used for the closure of places
of work, naturally assuming that both lie well below the level
where there is risk of non-stochastic health effects. The Work-
ing Group chose to use the same dose criteria for a week's work
as for a month's "normal" residence. Therefore in the following
the criteria 3 rem/week and 10 rem/week are considered for the
closure of places of work and institutions, cf. section 8.3.2.
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9.2. Radiation doses from work and transport in contaminated
areas that are not decontaminated
For the calculation of radiation doses from deposited activity
for work and transport in contaminated areas, use was made of
the following time-averaged shielding factors for municipali-
ties, cf. chapter 6, table 6.2:
- urban districts
23.8% x 0.015 x 0.1 + 5% x 0.25 x 0.1 = 0.0016
- non-urban districts
23.8% x 0.015 x 0.1 + 5% x 0.25 = 0.013
The shielding factors here derived for the individual sectors
are given in table 7.1 in chapter 7.
Figures 9.1 and 9.2 show the individual doses alone for work
and transport in, respectively, the first week and over thirty
years following an accident such as that in the BWR-2 case, as-
suming that no decontamination has taken place.
The largest individual dose in the first week is then approxi-
mately 1 rem, and over the first 30 years, approximately 20
rem.
Figures 9.3 and 9.4 show the corresponding individual doses in
the BWR-3 case. The largest individual doses over the first
week and over the first 30 years are, respectively, 0.3 rem
and 3 rem.
In the BWR-2 case, the total collective dose from work and
transport is approximately 7 Mmanrem, i.e., about 18% of the
total collective dose from work, transport, location out of
doors and location indoors.
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9.3, Radiation doses for work and transport in contaminated
areas that are decontaminated
After decontamination procedures, as outlined in chapter 8, in
the contaminated areas where the average dose over the second
month exceeds 0.25 remf the following time-averaged modified
shielding factors are used for the two types of municipality,
cf. chapter 8, table 8.1:
- urban areas
23.8% x 0.0015 + 5% x 0.019 = 0.00131
- non-urban areas
23.8% x 0.0015 + 5% x 0.0417 = 0.00244
Figure 9.5 shows the modified shielding factors (cf. section
8.3.1) for the individual sectors as they appear from distribut-
ing the modified shielding factors for the municipalities by
simple area-weighting.
Figure 9.6 shows the individual doses for work and transport
over 30 years following an accident like that in the BWR-2 case
when decontamination (hosing and digging) takes place during
the 2nd and 3rd week in areas where doses exceed 3 rem in the
first month, and during the course of two months in other areas
where doses exceed 0.25 rem in the second month. The largest in-
dividual dose over the first 30 years after the accident is then
approximately 5 rem.
9.4. Conclusion
The total collective doses up to a distance of 110 km from
Barseback for work and transport, with and without decontami-
nation measures, as well as the collective dose for work and
transport in the first month in the areas that are envisaged
relocated applying a criterion of 10 rem per month, are shown
for the BWR-2 case in the following table:
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Collective dose (30 y) Collective dose (1 mth)
up to distance of 110 km in relocated areas
Reference
situation 7.3 Mmandrem 0.2 Mmandrem
With a
decontamination
as described 2.6 Mmandrem
In the case of a rather slower decontamination, e.g.f only areas
where doses exceed 10 rem in the first month are decontaminated
during the two weeks, the collective doses will be somewhat
greater (in the given case 20%).
It can be seen that the collective dose from work and transport
over 30 years, after a decontamination as described, constitutes
approximately 20% of the total collective dose from being lo-
cated alternately out of doors, inside the home, at work and
during transport. This is largely the same percentage as in the
reference situation where no decontamination is carried out and
where normal activities are otherwise assumed.
Even when using a closure criterion of 3 rem/week, it would not
be necessary to close down places of work or institutions on
Danish territory after accidents like those termed BWR-2 and
BWR-3 cases.
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10. DOSE-REDUCING MEASURES RELATING TO THE PRODUCTION
OF FOODSTUFFS
10.1. The production of foodstuffs in the contaminated area
Agricultural products
To calculate the production of foodstuffs and fodders, Zealand
was arbitrarily divided up into a number of districts using a
grid of 30° ring sectors, as shown on fig. 10.1. Sector 9 rep-
resents the direction that the radioactive cloud is assumed to
take (see 7.2.1).
Using Danish agricultural statistics (Da 78), a calculation was
made of agricultural production in the different districts.
Tables 10.2-4 show the annual production in tons, of, respec-
tively, vegetable foodstuffs, animal foodstuffs, and fodder ma-
terials. On this basis a calculation can be made of the average
production per km2 of land in the different districts.
Fish
Statistics (Da 77) show that the annual catch in the Sound is
about 3000 t (1977). In the Kattegat the catch is about 150 000
t (1977) and in the area of the Belts and the Baltic some
35 000 t (1977). The total annual catch in Danish waters is
1.7 x 106 t, of which the main part is taken in the North Sea.
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Fig. 10.1. Survey of the districts.
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Table 10.2. Annual production in tons of animal products in
the districts (cf. fig. 10.1)
District Pork Beef and Natural milk Eggs
veal
C8
C9
C10
D9
D10
E9
E10
F8
F9
F10
G8
G9
G10
H8
H9
2
2
11
10
5
10
26
7
23
44
2.7
-
25.7
75.2
577
450
240
100
200
010
300
900
420
200
800
1
1
1
3
1
3
5
6.9
-
46.5
7.4
107
271
648
968
400
320
330
700
170
760
430
1
3
10
17
24
19
22
64
19
68
92
51 .9
-
407.0
40.7
570
380
200
400
200
900
800
600
400
500
900
1
1
2
1
19.6
-
19.1
29.4
49
532
479
020
761
704
396
970
88
460
830
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Table 10.3. Annual production in tons of vegetable fodder
materials
District
C8
C9
C10
D9
D10
E9
E10
F8
F9
F10
G8
G9
G10
H8
H9
in the
Barley
mixed
1
1
4
11
41
29
75
102
50
87
193
55
199
293
950
-
010
040
200
300
900
300
000
000
600
000
400
000
000
districts (cf
and Straw
grain
1
2
6
19
16
28
43
28
33
92
27
66
147
050
-
540
170
300
600
800
600
700
000
300
500
900
300
000
. fig. 10
Roots
1
4
9
17
53
54
60
75
173
56
649
523
880
-
140
120
140
200
700
200
800
000
000
000
800
000
000
.1)
Roots
(
1
4
8
27
29
27
37
91
30
318
283
tops)
950
-
70
60
920
900
200
200
600
500
600
800
800
000
000
Grass
green
3
6
2
31
40
73
86
139
107
109
333
119
275
411
and
fodder
320
-
140
850
500
400
600
400
000
000
000
000
000
000
000
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10.2, Relevant radionuclides associated with the contamination
of foodstuffs in the BWR-2 case
The radio-ecological significance of a radionuclide depends on
what amount of it is released and on its transfer factor from
release to the foodstuff concerned. Even if a radionuclide can
be transferred to foodstuffs/ it is not always certain that it
is of importance for the dose. This depends on the radiobiologi-
cal properties of the radionuclide - these being expressed by
the ALI value (annual limit of intake - the exact definition is
given in ICRP 79).
The amount of activity released depends on the inventory in the
reactor core at the time of the accident and on the circumstances
of the accident, cf. chapter 3, tables 3.1 and 3.2.
Investigations of radioactive fallout from nuclear weapons test-
ing (Aa 79) have provided knowledge of the transfer factors
(pCi kg"1 y (mCi km""2)""1) from deposition to the majority of
Danish foodstuffs for radionuclides such as 90gr/ 131j and
1 3 7Cs, i.e., under normal agricultural operations. As a result
of consistently effected deep ploughing, transfer factors can
be reduced by a factor of approximately 3 for 90Sr in the year
after the accident and the following years. It is 90Sr, 137Cs
and 131I that have been proved to play a part in the contamina-
tion of foodstuffs that results from nuclear weapons testing
(cf. e.g., UN 77).
In the BWR-2 case these nuclides would indeed be of importance,
although 134Cs would also play a role. The latter has a half-
life of 2.06 years and behaves as the longer-lived 1 3 7Cs. There-
fore, taking into account the shorter half-life, the transfer
factors for 134Cs can be estimated on the basis of those for
1 3 7Cs. If it is assumed that there is a delay between the con-
tamination of the field and the consumption of a foodstuff of
0.5 y on average, the transfer factor for 134Cs would be ap-
proximately 0.8 times that of 1 3 7Cs. If the foodstuffs produced
during the first year after the accident are destroyed, the
134Cs transfer factor would be 0.58 times the 137Cs transfer
- 149 -
factor then valid. If the foodstuffs produced in the second
year are destroyed, too, then the transfer factor for ^3^Cs
falls to 0.44 times that for 1 3 7Cs.
Table 10.4 shows the transfer factors used in the calculations
of 90Sr, 137Cs and 131I in, respectively, 1) the year of the
accident (year 0), 2) one year after the accident - the food-
stuffs produced during the year of the accident are assumed
destroyed - and 3) two years after the accident - the foodstuffs
produced in the year following the year of the accident are also
presumed destroyed, etc. Because of the short half-life of 131j
it only plays a part in the year of the accident. As a result
of the poor take-up of 137Cs from the soil via roots, this nu-
clide, too, would primarily be important during the year of the
accident. On the other hand, because 90Sr is easily taken up by
crops via the root net, this nuclide is of long-term signifi-
cance. Even if, for instance, crops were destroyed every year
for four years following the accident, the committed effective
dose equivalent from 90$r in milk would only be rather more
than halved, and in the case of vegetables there is only a re-
duction of hardly 20%.
The transfer factors shown in table 10.4 are calculated on the
basis of measurements of radioactive fallout in eastern Denmark.
This means that a seasonal distribution is used that corresponds
to that of the fallout. Therefore the months May to August are
given the greatest weight because the majority of fallout oc-
curs at this season owing to different meteorological factors.
If, instead, all months of the year are weighted equally, the
transfer factors would have been smaller as crops are most
sensitive to contamination in the period May to August.
In winter, for example, there are hardly any crops on the fields
and the transfer factors will therefore be smaller at this
season: for 131j they would actually be zero. If contamination
occurred in May-August, the transfer factors would, on the
other hand, be larger than those used here. Averaged over the
year, however, the factors used would give an over-estimation.
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There is a further factor that contributes to an over-evaluation
of the transfer of activity from deposition to the human diet.
In the case of grain, it is reckoned that this is consumed as a
whole grain and not, as is actually the case at least for wheat,
in the form of flour with an extraction factor of 70-75%. This
would reduce the 90Sr levels in wheat by a factor of approx. 5
and 137Cs by a factor of approx. 2.
For milk, no allowance is made for the fact that a substantial
share of the milk produced is used for the manufacture of cheese
and butter. Some of the whey and skimmed milk for this produc-
tion, which would contain both 137cs and 90gr, is used as live-
stock fodder and is thus not directly included in the human
diet, as here assumed. As a result, the 90gr that is assumed to
be consumed from milk is over-estimated by a factor of approx.
1.7, 137cs by a factor of approx. 2.6, and 131 j by a factor of
approx. 6. As the uncertainty of the transfer factors is about
30%, and because there is considerable uncertainty relating to
other factors included in the calculations of the foodstuff con-
tamination that would result in the BWR-2 case, there are hardly
grounds for a further refinement of the calculations.
With regard to other radionuclides, 89gr and 140sa have such
short half-lives that they would only be found in products
harvested in the year of the accident. Before these reached
consumers, however, the radionuclides would have decayed con-
siderably - 89sr is reduced by a factor 12 in six months and
14()Ba by a factor 2 x 104. 1°6Ru would also give the majority
of its committed effective dose equivalent during the first
year, and as its transfer factor from deposition to the human
diet is hardly half that of radiocaesium, the committed effec-
tive dose equivalent from 1°6Ru would in any case be an order
of magnitude less than the contribution from radiocaesium. The
amounts of plutonium and americium are so small that they play
no part, and, moreover, their transfer factors are significant-
ly smaller than those of 90gr an(j 137cs# p o r comparison, the
239Pu release in the BWR-2 case is roughly three times as great
as the existing amount of plutonium fallout on Zealand from nu-
clear weapons testing, and the amount of 24iAm in the release
- 152 -
is of the same magnitude as the amount of radioactive fallout of
americium.
10.3. Inventory and dose calculations relating to agricultural
production on Zealand contaminated in the BWR-2 case
Using the tables of products 10.1-3, and multiplying by the
transfer factors in table 10.4, the inventories of agricultural
products from the different districts can be calculated with
respect to 90sr, 137cs and 131j for a so-called unit deposition
(1 mCi km"2 of the radionuclide concerned). If these figures are
multiplied by the assumed depositions in the BWR-2 case (cf.
table 10.5) , tables 10.6-11 can be calculated.
Only the inventories of 9°Sr, 137Cs and 131 j
 a r e given here, but
an estimate of the inventories of 134Cs can be obtained by mul-
tiplying the inventories of 137cs in the three tables by the re-
lation between 134cs and 137cs in the release, i.e., 0.664, and
then multiplying by, respectively, 0.80, 0.58 and 0.44, i.e., the
respective relative transfer factors for 134cs as given earlier.
The collective committed effective dose equivalents are calcu-
lated for 90Sr, 137cs, 134cs and 131i. These values are calcu-
lated on the basis of the inventories by dividing by the ALI val-
ues of the radionuclides (in mCi) and multiplying by 5, the ALI
value being the amount of activity consumed in the course of a
year together with foodstuffs that will result in a committed
effective dose equivalent of 5 rem (0.05 Sv).
For 9 0Sr, the doses thus calculated are divided by 3 because the
ICRP calculation does not take into account the high content of
calcium in the Danish diet (620 g annually per capita). Should
the foodstuffs be exported to countries with little calcium in
the diet (C 200 g annually per capita) it would be correct to
use the ALI values without this adjustment. However, it should
be noted that exports mainly comprise animal products with a re-
latively low strontium content (pork, butter, eggs).
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Table 10.5. The deposition (Ci/km^) in the different districts
(cf. fig. 10.1) in the BWR-2 case (stability F, u = 5 m/s,
vg = 2 cm/s1>)
District
C8
C9
C10
D9
D10
E9
E10
F8
F9
F10
G8
G9
G10
H8
H9
90Sr
2
450
2
250
1
140
0.3
0.1
70
0.1
0.02
30
0.04
0
12
137Cs
15
2850
13
1600
4
900
2
0.5
450
0.5
0.2
200
0.3
0.04
75
13^
230
46500
200
25500
70
14900
30
10
7100
10
2.5
3000
4
0.5
1500
1) This deposition velocity implies that about 95% of the
fallout occurs inside a distance of 130 km fra Barseback.
A smaller vg value (cf. chapter 4) reduces the fallout on
Zealand/ but this would spread more activity further out to
Funen and Jutland. However, the manrem doses arising from
foodstuffs are not significantly smaller if vg is reduced
to, e.g., 1 cm/s.
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Table 10.7. BWR-2 case. Collective doses from foodstuffs
produced in the districts^) calculated from the year of the
accident onwards.
Mmanrem
District
90Sr 137Cs 134Cs
C8
C9
C10
D9
D10
E9
E10
F8
F9
F10
G8
G9
G10
H8
H9
E Mmanrem 12.0 98 69 16.3 196
0
0
0
0.64
0
3.0
0
0
3.4
0
0
3.1
0
0
1.87
0.02
0
0.04
3.9
0.03
22
0.04
0.03
28
0.02
0.01
28
0.01
0
16.3
0.01
0
0.03
2 .7
0.02
15
0.03
0.02
20
0.01
0.01
20
0.01
0
11.4
0
0
0
0.15
0
1 .71
0.01
0
4.9
0.01
0
5.5
0
0
4 .0
0
0
0.1
7.4
0.1
42
0.1
0.1
56
0
0
57
0
0
34
)Note; The doses need not necessarily appear in the districts
concerned because foodstuffs are often consumed in areas
other than those in which they are produced.
As the division into sectors is arbitraryf only part of the
area in sector 9 might be so heavily contaminated as to re-
quire intervention.
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Table 10.8, BWR-2 case. The inventories in foodstuffs and
fodders produced in the districts calculated from the year
after the accident onwards - i.e.f foodstuffs produced during
the year of the accident are destroyed.
District
C8
C9
C10
D9
D10
E9
E10
F8
F9
F10
G8
G9
G10
H8
H9
Veg.
food-
stuffs
0
0
0
3.6
0
16.1
0
0
16.3
0
0
15.2
0
0
9.3
Ci 90S
Animal
food-
stuffs
0
0
0
0
0
1 .5
0
0
4.8
0
0
5.4
0
0
3.2
r
Veg.
fodders
0.6
0
0.5
59
1 .6
440
1.3
0.8
760
0.9
0.2
830
0.4
0.3
680
Veg.
food-
stuffs
0
0
0
1 .2
0
3.3
0
0
1.9
0
0
1 .8
0
0
1.0
Ci 137Cs
Animal
food-
stuffs
0
0
0
2.3
0.1
45
0.1
0.1
98
0.1
0
115
0
0
70
Veg.
fodders
0.5
0
0.7
41
1.1
340
1 .4
0.4
610
0.5
0.2
660
0.4
0.1
350
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Table 10.9. BWR-2 case. The collective doses from
foodstuffs produced in the districts calculated from
the year after the accident onwards.
Mmanrem
District
90Sr 137Cs 134Cs
C8
C9
C10
D9
D10
E9
E10
F8
F9
F10
G8
G9
G10
H8
H9
0
0
0
0.23
0
1 .10
0
0
1.30
0
0
1.27
0
0
0.77
0
0
0
0.16
0
2 .2
0.01
0.01
4.6
0
0
5.4
0
0
3.3
0
0
0
0.08
0
1 .12
0
0
2.3
0
0
2.8
0
0
1.68
0
0
0
0.5
0
4 .4
0
0
8.2
0
0
9.5
0
0
5.8
E Mmanrem 4.7 15.7 8.0 28
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Table 10.10, BWR-2 case. The inventories in foodstuffs and
fodders produced in the districts calculated from the second
year after the accident onwards - i.e., foodstuffs in the
year of the accident and the following year are destroyed.
District
, C8
C9
C10
D9
D10
E9
E10
F8
F9
F10
G8
G9
G10
H8
H9
Veg.
food-
stuffs
0^
0
0
3.5
0
15.4
0
0
15.6
0
0
14.5
0
0
8.9
Ci 90
Animal
food-
stuffs
0
0
0
0
0
1 .3
0
0
4.0
0
0
4.6
0
0
2.7
Sr
Veg.
fodders
0.4
0
0.2
43
1.0
320
0.9
0.6
560
0.6
0.2
630
0.3
0.2
570
Veg.
food-
stuffs
0
0
0
0.8
0
2.1
0
0
1.2
0
0
1 .3
0
0
0.7
Ci 137C
Animal
food-
stuffs
0
0
0
0.3
0
6.5
0
0
15.5
0
0
18.3
0
0
10.8
s
Veg.
fodders
0.5
0
0.6
37
1.0
310
1.2
0.4
540
0.5
0.2
590
0.3
0.1
320
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Table 10.11. BWR-2 case. Collective doses from foodstuffs
produced in the districts calculated from the second year
after the accident onwards.
Mmanrem
District
137Cs 134Cs
C8
C9
C10
D9
D10
E9
E10
F8
F9
F10
G8
G9
G10
H8
H9
0
0
0
0.22
0
1.03
0
0
1.2
0
0
1 .17
0
0
0.70
0
0
0
0.05
0
0.04
0
0
0.77
0
0
0.91
0
0
0.53
0
0
0
0.02
0
0.16
0
0
0.30
0
0
0.35
0
0
0.21
0
0
0
0.3
0
1.6
0
0
2.3
0
0
2 .4
0
0
1.4
Mmanrem 4.3 2.7 1.0 8
- 160 -
Table 10.7 shows that 99.9% of the total collective dose equiva-
lent from the consumption of contaminated food produced on Zea-
land originates from the districts D9, E9f F9f G9 and H9, which
cover a total area of 3500 km2, i.e., about half the area of
Zealand. On the other hand, the sector division does not make it
possible to determine whether the contamination is concentrated
in a narrow belt inside this area.
A comparison of tables 10.7 and 10.9 shows that the destruction
of foodstuffs (but not of livestock fodders) during the year of
the accident reduces the collective dose by 169 Megamanrem. If
the value of a manrem is set at 100 Danish kroner, this reduc-
tion represents 17 x 109 kroner. As the value of Denmark's
harvest (in 1976) was some 30 x 109 kroner, and because the
area concerned comprises less than 10% of the agricultural
land of the country, it is obvious that the foodstuffs should
be destroyed. In the following year the value of the foodstuffs
will be a little more than the value of the collective dose?
here, too, foodstuffs would probably be destroyed. However, it
would of course be preferable to alter agricultural production
so that it would be unnecessary to destroy any foodstuffs other
than from the year in which the accident occurred.
It should be possible to limit the destruction of foodstuffs
during the year of the accident to the crops standing on the
fields at the time it took place. Moreover, livestock could be
saved if housed and fed on uncontaminated fodder, or perhaps
evacuated to other parts of the country. Section 10.5 gives
more details of which long-term measures could reduce the doses
originating from agricultural products produced in the conta-
minated area.
10.4. Inventory and dose calculations for agricultural
production on Zealand contaminated in the BWR-3 case
Analogous with the calculations in 10.3, inventories and doses
can be calculated for the BWR-3 case. Table 10.12 shows the
depositions in the different sectors and tables 10.13-18 are
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analogous to tables 10.6-11.
It appears that the BWR-3 case would result in foodstuff doses
approximately one order of magnitude less than the doses result-
ing from the BWR-2 case. It would, however, still be necessary
to take certain measures during the year following the accident;
if no action was taken doses would be approximately 2 x 10^ man-
rem ~ 2 * 10^ kr. (1 manrem ~ 100 kr.)f or of nearly the same
magnitude as the value of the annual agricultural production of
the area concerned ~ 2.5 x 10^ kr.
Table 10.12. BWR-3 case. Deposition (Ci/km2) in the
districts (cf. fig. 10.1). Stability D, u = 10 m/s,
vg = 2 cm/s
District 90Sr 131I 137Cs
C8
C9
C10
D9
D10
E9
E10
F8
F9
F10
G8
G9
G10
H8
H9
0.
14
0.
8
0.
5
0
0
3
0
0
2
0
0
1.
03
03
01
5
3
2000
3
900
1
575
0.3
0.1
350
0.1
0.1
210
0.1
0
165
0.3
175
0.3
100
0.1
65
0
0
40
0
0
25
0
0
20
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Table 10.14. BWR-3 case. Collective doses from foodstuffs
produced in the districts 1) calculated from the year of the
accident onwards.
Mmanrem
District
134Cs
C8
C9
C10
D9
D10
E9
E10
F8
P9
F10
G8
G9
G10
H8
H9
I Mmanrem .0.71 12.1 8.5 1.13 22.5
1)cf. notes to table 10.7.
0
0
0
0.02
0
0.11
0
0
0.15
0
0
0.21
0
0
0.23
0
0
0
0.24
0
1.59
0
0
2.5
0
0
3.5
0
0
4.3
0
0
0
0.17
0
1.08
0
0
1.78
0
0
2.5
0
0
3.0
0
0
0
0.01
0
0.07
0
0
0.24
0
0
0.38
0
0
0.44
0
0
0
0.43
0
2.8
0
0
4 .7
0
0
6.6
0
0
8.0
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Table 10.15. BWR-3 case. The inventories in foodstuffs and
fodder produced in the districts calculated from the year
after the accident onwards - i.e., foodstuffs produced in the
year of the accident are destroyed.
District
Veg. Animal Veg.
food- food- fodders
stuffs stuffs
Veg. Animal Veg.
food- food- fodders
stuffs stuffs
C8
C9
C10
D9
D10
E9
E10
F8
F9
F10
G8
G9
G10
H8
H9
0.
0
0
0 .
0
0 .
0
0
0 .
0
0
1 .
0
0
1 .
1
6
7
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
.1
.2
.4
.4
0
0
0
1.9
0
15.7
0
0
33
0
0
55
0
0
85
0
0
0
0.1
0
0 .2
0
0
0.2
0
0
0 .2
0
0
0.3
0
0
0
0.1
0
3 .2
0
0
8.7
0
0
14.4
0
0
18.7
0
0
0
2.6
0
25
0
0
54
0
0
82
0
0
93
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Table 10.16. BWR-3 case. Collective doses from foodstuffs
produced in the districts calculated from the year after
the accident onwards.
Mmanrem
District
90Sr 137Cs 134Cs
C8
C9
C10
D9
D10
E9
E10
F8
F9
F10
G8
G9
G10
H8
H9
0
0
0
0.01
0
0.04
0
0
0.06
0
0
0.09
0
0
0.10
0
0
0
0.01
0
0.16
0
0
0.41
0
0
0.68
0
0
0.88
0
0
0
0
0
0.08
0
0
0.20
0
0
0.35
0
0
0.45
0
0
0
0.02
0
0.28
0
0
0.67
0
0
1.12
0
0
1.43
Z Mmanrem 0.28 2.1 1.09 3.5
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Table 10,17. BWR-3 case. The inventories in foodstuffs and
fodder produced in the districts calculated from the second
year after the accident onwards - i.e., foodstuffs from the
year of the accident and the following year are destroyed.
District
C8
C9
C10
D9
D10
E9
E10
F8
F9
F10
G8
G9
G10
H8
H9
Veg.
food-
stuffs
0
0
0
0.1
0
0.6
0
0
0.7
0
0
1.0
0
0
1.1
Ci
Animal
food-
stuffs
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.2
0
0
0.3
0
0
0.3
90 S r
Veg.
fodders
0
0
0
1 .4
0
11.4
0
0
24
0
0
42
0
0
71
Veg.
food-
stuffs
0
0
0
0
0
0.2
0
0
0.1
0
0
0.2
0
0
0.2
Ci 137Cs
Animal
food-
stuffs
0
0
0
0
0
0.5
0
0
1.4
0
0
2.3
0
0
2.9
Veg.
fodders
0
0
0
2.3
0
22
0
0
48
0
0
74
0
0
85
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Table 10.18. BWR-3 case. Collective closes from foodstuffs
produced in the districts calculated from the second year
after the accident onwards.
Mmanrem
District
90 S r 137Cs 134Cs
C8
C9
C10
D9
D10
E9
E10
F8
F9
F10
G8
G9
G10
H8
H9
0
0
0
0
0
0.04
0
0
0.05
0
0
0.08
0
0
0.09
0
0
0
0
0
0.03
0
0
0.07
0
0
0.11
0
0
0.14
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.03
0
0
0.04
0
0
0.06
0
0
0
0.01
0
0.08
0
0
0.15
0
0
0.24
0
0
0.28
E Mmanrem 0.26 0.36 0.14 0.75
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10.5. Alterations in agricultural production that might be
necessary to reduce doses
Because, as appears from the foregoing, 90gr disappears only
slowly from foodstuffs, while 137cSf 134cs and 131j vanish re-
latively rapidly, it is desirable to produce such foodstuffs
that have low transfer factors for 90sr: fchese a r e beef, pork
and eggs. If, furthermore, the 90sr levels are to be kept as
low as possible in these products, i.e., the transfer factors
should be reduced, then grain (rye and barley), potatoes, and
grass should be cultivated chiefly, any milk being used for
butter and the skimmed milk fed to pigs.
Taking the most extreme action then, the contaminated areas
should be used only for crops that do not transfer 90gr to
foodstuffs. They could perhaps be used for seed-growing and the
cultivation of seed grain. Cultivation of sugar beet and pota-
toes leading to a production of refined agricultural products
could also be envisaged. These would contain virtually no ac-
tivity.
In the following an example is given of a calculation of the
effects on doses of a re-organisation of agricultural produc-
tion.
The most heavily contaminated area (sector 9 on fig. 10.1)
comprises approximately 2500 km2 of agricultural land. If this
is used exclusively to cultivate grain, and reckoning with a
yield of 470 t per km2 (the average for grain-growing areas on
Zealand), then 1 175 000 tons of grain would be produced annu-
ally. Using this exclusively to feed pigs - 5 kg of grain are
needed to produce 1 kg pork - production would be 235 000 tons
of pork per year. Sector 9 produces about 107 000 tons of meat
(and eggs) annually, i.e., meat production in this area could
be doubled if grain alone is cultivated and then fed to pigs.
Envisaging that this alteration in production takes place al-
ready in the year following that of the accident, and further-
more that foodstuffs and fodder from the year of the accident
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have been destroyed, the inventory in fodder (barley grain)
produced in the second year will be 234 Ci 90Sr, as the amount
of radiocaesium is minimal (see the footnote to table 10.4) ,
and the straw from the grain is destroyed. This is a reduction
in the 90gr content of the fodder by a factor 9. If this grain
is used for pig production, the inventory in the pork will be:
0.109 x 235000 x 234 = 5.1 ci 90Sr
1175000
as 0.109 is the relation between the 90sr concentrations in
pork and barley calculated on the basis of the concentrations
in sector 9 in the year of the accident.
The collective committed effective dose equivalent from this
amount of 90Sr will be (5.1 x 0.5): (8.1 x 10~6) = 0.31 Mmanrem;
235 000 tons of pork correspond to the annual consumption of
pork of (235 x 106):40 = 5.88 x 106 people, i.e., the average
committed effective individual dose equivalent will be 53 mrem.
Comparing the collective dose with that in table 10.12, it ap-
pears that a re-organisation of agricultural production gives a
dose reduction of a factor of approx. 25.
Imagining that barley, moreover, contains 137Cs corresponding
to the transfer factor 0.1 pCi 137Cs kg"1 y (mCi km~2)-1f the
collective dose from this would be about 0.28 Mmanrem, i.e., of
the same magnitude as the ^Sr dose (barley cone. = pork cone.
= 26 nCi kg"1; consumption ~ 6 Ci 137Cs with pork).
10.6. Doses originating from marine products
Considering the BWR-2 case, 1.07 x 105 Ci 90Sr, 1.11 x 107 Ci
1 3 1 I , 6.84 x 105 Ci 137Cs and 4.54 x 105 Ci 134Cs would fall in-
to the Sound. Through Danish waters there flows a north-running
surface current from the Baltic of approx. 103 km3 per year and
a south-running current from the North Sea of approx. 5 x 10^
km3 per year. The mean retention time for activity in the Sound,
which contains only some few km3, will therefore be very short,
and in the present calculations it is assumed that inner Danish
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waters can be considered as part of the Baltic and that one-third
of the activity from the accident is distributed in the Baltic
area, two-thirds in the North Sea.
10.6.1. The Baltic area (BWR-2 case)
The Baltic contains 2 x 10^ km3 water and the mean retention
time for a substance that only disappears as a result of the re-
placement of the water masses is 20-30 y (~ 25 y) (CEC 79). The
annual catch of fish in the Baltic is 8 x 10^ kg. Fallout meas-
urements have shown that about one-third of the amount of 1 37c s
in the Baltic is found in the sediments and that the concentra-
tion factor for sea water to fish is approx. 102 for caesium.
The concentration factor for 90sr is approx. 1, for which reason
this substance can be disregarded in this connection. The half-
life of 131j is s o short that this, too, is of no significance.
The mean retention time in the Baltic area (Tef) is found to be,
for 137Cs, 15.85 y (_L = \ + JL)
T e f 30/ln2 25
and similarly, for 1 3 4Cs, 2.66 y.
6.84 x 105 x 1012 x 0.7 -
 1
Sea water cone: pCi I"1 = 8 pCi I""1
3 x 2 x 1016
The time-integrated concentration: 8 x 15.85 = 126 pCi I""1 y.
In fish: 126 x 102 = 12600 pCi kg"1 y.
In consumer fish: 126000 x 8 x 108 : 109 = 10000 mCi
Collective dose: 10000 x 5 =0.5 Mmanrem
0.108 x 106
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Sea water cone: = 5.3 pCi I""1
The time-integrated concentration: = 14 pCi 1~1 y
In fish: = 1400 pCi kg"1 y
In consumer fish: 1100 mCi
Collective dose: = 0.07 Mmanrem
10.6.2. The North Sea (BWR-2 case)
The North Sea contains 7 x 10^ km3, and the mean retention time
for a substance that only disappears as a result of the re-
placement of the water masses is approximately 3.5 year (CEC
79).
The annual catch of consumer fish in the North Sea is approx.
2 x io9 kg. The sedimentation of caesium in the North Sea is
estimated to be about 10%. The concentration factor from sea
water to fish is 50 for radiocaesium. As in the case of the
Baltic, 90sr
 an(=| 131 j a r e disregarded.
The mean retention time in the North Sea is:
for 1 3 7Cs f 3.24 y
and, for 134 C s, 1.6 y.
137Cs:
Sea water concentration: = 5.9 pCi I""1
The time-integrated concentration: = 19 pCi 1""1 y
In fish: 950 pCi kg""1 y
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In consumer fish: 1900 mCi
Collective dose: 0.09 Mmanrem
134Cs
Sea water concentration: 3.9 pCi 1~1
The time-integrated concentration: 6 pCi 1~1 y
In fish: 300 pCi kg"1 y
In consumer fish: 600 mCi
Collective dose: 0.04 Mmanrem
10.6.3. Total doses from marine products in the BWR-2 case
The collective committed effective dose equivalent from the
consumption of marine products in the BWR-2 case would be ap-
proximately 0.7 Mmanrem. This value would not justify the de-
struction of the catch from the Baltic and the North Sea.
The North Atlantic would be the final recipient of radiocaesium
contamination, but the concentration here would be so low - as
a result of the great dilution - that the collective dose from
fish catches, which are of an order of magnitude of 10^ kg per
annum in this area, would be negligible compared with doses
from the Baltic and the North Sea area.
Run-off from the contaminated land could slightly increase the
concentration in the sea, but this would be only of an order of
magnitude of 10%.
An attempt can be made to estimate the collective dose from the
contamination of marine foodstuffs in a different way.
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In the North Sea and Baltic area, the average fish catch is
1600 kg km"2 y~1. The transfer factor for 137Cs to cod from fall-
out is in Danish waters calculated to be 20 pCi kg""1 y (mCi
km-2)""1 (Aa 79). Assuming that the 7 x 105 Ci 137Cs from the
accident is distributed over one km2, then the time-integrated
amount of 137Cs in the catch would be:
7 x 105 x 103 x 20 x 1600 - „
mCi = 22 Ci 137Cs
109
and the collective dose from this would be approx. 1 Mmanrem.
Assuming that the relation between 134Cs and total caesium dose
is 14%, the dose from radiocaesium will be a total of 1.15 Mman-
rem, if all fish consumed are cod. Because a considerable part
of the catch consists of fish that contain less activity than
cod, there is good agreement between this estimate and that
made above.
10.6.4. Total doses from marine products in the BWR-3 case
In the BWR-3 case the doses would be reduced to approx. 0.2 x
10^ manrem compared with the 1 x 1O*> manrem in the BWR-2 case,
because the deposition of radiocaesium in the Sound from the
former situation is about 16% of that of the latter.
10.7. Supplies of drinking water
Drinking water in Denmark originates primarily from ground
water, a small share from surface water. Riso's investigations
(Aa 79) of the 90Sr concentrations in ground water, drinking
water and lake/river water collected from all parts of the
country during the last twenty years gave the results summar-
ized in the following table.
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Table 10.19. Transfer factors [pCi 1~1 y per mCi km"2] for
from fallout to fresh water
Ground water 0.007
prinking water 0.005
River water 0.3
Lake water . 0.9
Water supplies for Copenhagen are derived from a little lake
water in addition to ground water. Table 10.19 showsf however,
that the 90Sr concentration in drinking water could be reduced
if surface water was excluded from the water supply. But meas-
urements carried out on drinking water in Copenhagen make it
clear that contributions of surface water to this are so small
that the drinking water can be considered as virtually pure
ground water.
Comparing the contributions to the dose from 90gr in the diet
with the contributions from drinking waterf we find that 1 mCi
90sr km""2 results in a total consumption with food of 3000 pCi
90Sr per person, while the intake with drinking water is 3 pCi
90Sr, i.e., 1 o/oo. Had the drinking water been derived from
the average Danish lake water, the intake would have been 540
pCi or 18% of the intake with food.
The amount of 137Cs released in the BWR-2 case would be some
ten times greater than the amount of 90Sr, but 137Cs is more
effectively retained in Danish soil than is 90Sr, and the
transfer factors for 137cs from fallout to fresh water would
therefore be smaller than for 90Sr. Measurements of 137Cs in
Danish rivers and lakes make it possible to assume that the
transfer factors for 137Cs from fallout to fresh water are ap-
proximately 10% of the values given in table 10.19. This means
that the contribution of 137Cs from drinking water could be
negligible (< 0.1 o/oo) compared with the contribution from the
diet (5600 pCi ^37Cs per person per mCi ^37Cs km~ 2), which
again would only contribute at most one third of the dose re-
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ceived from external radiation originating from the 137cs de-
posited on the ground.
Radionuclides other than 9°Sr and ^ 7 C s would not occur in any
significant amounts in Danish drinking water after a core-melt
accident at Barseback.
To conclude, the contributions from the contamination of drink-
ing water by radionuclides released in a core-melt accident at
Barseback would be insignificant.
10.8. Summary
Based on the possible alterations in agricultural production
outlined in 10.5, a minimum of five options exist. Here it is
assumed that the accident occurs in May of year 0f i.e., at a
season when cattle have begun to graze the fodder (grass) of
year 0, and when the crops (grain, vegetables, roots, etc.) are
above ground and thus sensitive to direct contamination. The
options are:
1) No action is taken after the accident.
2) Foodstuffs produced in sector 9 during the twelve
months following the accident, i.e., produced in the
period May (0) to April (1) are destroyed.
This means that vegetable foodstuffs (grain products,
vegetables, etc.) are destroyed, that milk and eggs are
discarded, and that no livestock are slaughtered; but
livestock are otherwise retained and fed on the contami-
nated fodder produced in the area.
3) Foodstuffs produced in sector 9 during the 24 months
following the accident, i.e., foodstuffs produced in the
period May (0) to April (2), are destroyed.
The procedure is that outlined under 2, i.e., crops are
sown and the products used to feed livestock, but no live-
stock products are used for human consumption.
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4) Crops standing on the fields in sector 9 are destroyed in
year 0. Livestock are immediately housed and fed uncon-
taminated fodder from other parts of the country, perhaps
even from abroad. From year (1) onwards sector 9 is used
to produce barley, and livestock production is confined
to pigs, fed on the barley produced in the area. Barley
straw is destroyed.
5) Crops standing on the fields in sector 9 are destroyed in
year (0). Livestock are immediately housed and fed uncon-
taminated fodder. From year (1) onwards sector 9 is used
for the production of seed grain and for seed-growing, as
also for the production of sugar beet and potatoes. The
beet is used for sugar production only, beet wastes are
discarded. The potatoes are used for the distillation of
alcohol, wastes are discarded. Straw and hay from seed-
growing are destroyed. No further livestock production
takes place in this area.
Table 10.20 summarizes the consequences with regard to doses
for these five options.
Although the object of the present report is to calculate the
consequences of land contamination on Zealand, some supplement-
ary calculations were made for agricultural production on the
island of Funen. These were carried out exactly as for Zealand
and they covered the whole of Funen as one area. The results
are given in table 10.21.
Table 10.21. Collective committed effective dose equivalents
resulting from the consumption of foodstuffs produced on
Funen (Mmanrem) calculated from the year of the accident
onwards.
Case 90sr 1 3 7Cs 1 3 4Cs 131X Total
BWR-2 0.4 3.6 2.5 1.3 8
BWR-3 0.1 2.7 1.9 0.6 5
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Assuming that the relationship between the doses in years 0, 1
and 2 after the accident is the same on Funen as on Zealand,
the dose reductions obtained by^  destroying the harvest from the
first year on Funen are calculated as 7 Mmanrem in the BWR-2
and 4 Mmanrem in the BWR-3 case.
As the value of one year's agricultural production on Funen is
2.5 x 109 kroner (the agricultural area covers 2533 km2 and the
value of production on 1 km2 is 106 kroner), and the equivalent
value of 7 x 106 and 4 x 106 manrem are, respectively, 0.7 x 109
kroner and 0.4 x 109 kronerf intervention might be justified on
Funen during the first year after the accident, for both types
of accident, under the given assumptions.
The whole of the production on Funen need not necessarily be
destroyed because contamination would not be uniformly distrib-
uted. Measurements would have to be carried out to determine
the extent of intervention.
Further intervention relating to crops on Funen in the following
years would hardly be justified in either case as the dose re-
duction would be only of the order of one Mmanrem.
As appears from the above, both cases could imply restrictions
on agricultural production in parts of Zealand and perhaps also
on Funen. Alterations in agricultural production in the conta-
minated areas would give a very significant reduction in the
collective dose from foodstuffs produced on the soil. In this
case marine products would be the primary source of the dose,
but it would hardly be possible to reduce this significantly
because it would be distributed over a large area and over a
large population (the population of North Europe ~ 10 8). On
the other hand, individual doses would be small (-10 mrem).
Incidentally, the amount of radiocaesium released to the marine
environment in the BWR-2 case would be of the same order of
magnitude as the release, to date, of radiocaesium from the
Sellafield (Windscale) reprocessing plant in the UK.
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11. WASTE TREATMENT
11,1. Liquid wastes
Should there occur an accident at the Barseback nuclear power
plant in which activity is dry-deposited in the Greater Copen-
hagen area, the first shower of rain would wash some of the
activity into the sewers, just as decontamination procedures
such as the hosing of roads and buildings would carry the ma-
terial washed off into the sewer system.
Sewage from the Greater Copenhagen area ends up in the filter
plant Lynetten, from where water is led out into the Sound. The
area is divided into four districts. Sewage from one district
is given a fairly thorough purification at the Damhusli plant.
Sewage from two other districts is given a rough pre-treatment
and that from the last district is taken to Lynetten without
any kind of pre-treatment.
At Damhusa, sludge is collected in drying beds; both the Lynet-
ten and the Damhusa plants are modern and automatic.
Some estimates follow of the radiation levels pertaining to the
sludge-drying beds and of the sewerage itself. It is assumed
roughly that the Lynetten plant receives water from the area 20-
26 km from Barseback and the Damhusa plant from the area 26-30
km from Barseback.
Tables 11.1 and 11.2 show the initial deposition in three 10°
sectors having the main directions 239°, 249° and 259° in the
BWR-2 case. Outside these three sectors, activity levels are
more than two orders of magnitude lower. Assuming that a max.
of 40% of the activity runs into the sewerage, e.g., after a
decontamination process, the following amounts of activity
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Table 1 1 J . Deposition of 1 3 7Cs in the Greater Copenhagen area
in the BWR-2 case
Distance
(km)
from
Barseback
-
20 -
22 -
24 -
26 -
28 -
- 22
- 24
- 26
- 28
- 30
kCi
2
3
4
7
9
.26
.60
.90
.30
.65
137 C s
239°
mC]
P-
0
0
0
0
L «m
.3.1
.45
.56
.78
.95
deposition in
-2 kCi
10.
16.
24.
35.
249°
the .
mCi »m~
8 ^ 0
8 1
5 1
0 2
2 3
.93
.34
.89
.55
.47
10° segments
2
259°
kCi mCi
2
3
4.
7
9
.13 0.
.53 0.
.84 0.
.15 0.
.95 0.
•m-2
29
44
56
76
98
Table 11.2. Total deposition of all depositable isotopes in the
area of Greater Copenhagen in the BWR-2 case
Distance
(km)
from
Barseback
-20 -
22 -
24 -
26 -
28 -
22
24
26
28
30
Total deposition
kCi
101
162
220
328
434
239°
mCi•m~^
13.8
20.2
25.2
34.8
42.9
of
kCi
305
484
741
1080
1580
activity
249°
mCi •m
41.
60.
84.
115
156
in
-
2
6
3
9
the 1
kCi
96
158
218
321
448
0° segments
259°
mCi •
13
19
25
34
44
m-2
.1
.7
.0
.1
.3
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will end up in the Damhuså and Lynetten filter beds, respec-
tively:
Damhuså: 1.7•106 Ci in all, of which:
3.7.104 Ci 137Cs
2.5.104 Ci 134Cs
Lynetten: 1•0•106 Ci in all, of which:
2.2.104 Ci 137Cs
1.5.104 Ci 134Cs
Assuming that the sewer system is 100 km long, a uniform dis-
tribution over the entire system of an estimated tenth of the
40% washed off, i.e. approx. 0.27 MCi, gives rise to an initial
radiation level in the sewers of approx. 1 Rh-1 Calculations
are made for a line source of infinite length (in practice 400-
500 m long) with a source strength of 0.27 MCi/100 km ~ 2.7
The Lynetten plant produces approximately 1000 tons of dry
sludge daily. This is incinerated and thus converted into 100
tons ash, which for the time being is placed in a heap facing
the seashore, surrounded by a ring wall. Later it may be used
for road surfacing.
Assuming that the amounts of activity given above for the Ly-
netten plant (no activity remaining in the sewers) are found in
a heap of 1000 tons of dry sludge (incineration would be in-
appropriate), the radiation level would be (calculated for an
upright cylinder with a radius and height of 6 m - 700 m3):
Lynetten: 270 R.h-1.
After a few months, when only the caesium isotopes remain, the
radiation level 1 m from the heap will be:
Lynetten: 10 R.h-1.
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To avoid the accumulation of activity in sludge heaps, it would
be an advantage from the viewpoint of health physics to lead
the sewage from the Greater Copenhagen area round the purifi-
cation plants and directly into the Sound, The total amount of
activity washed off the area lying 20 to 30 km from Barsebäck
comprises, namely, less than 10% of the amount of activity al-
ready deposited in the Sound as a result of the passage of the
cloud.
11.2. Solid waste
Some estimations follow of the radiation levels that would re-
sult from the asphalt removed from road surfaces as a dose-
reducing measure.
The asphalt is assumed to be 2 cm thick, and an estimation is
made of what 10 tons of asphalt would, at worst, imply of radi-
ation levels. The density of asphalt is 2.28 g.cm-3, and 10
tons of asphalt correspond therefore to 10/2.28 = 4.38 m3
asphalt. With a thickness of 0.02 m, 10 tons of asphalt would
correspond to an area of 4.38/0.02 = 220 m2 road.
According to table 11.2, the initial surface concentration in
the most highly contaminated area is approx. 0.16 Ci.m2 . 10
tons of asphalt would therefore contain a maximum of 0.16.220 =
35 Ci. If 10 tons of asphalt are loaded onto a lorry, and if
the heap of asphalt is reckoned to be cylindrical in shape
(radius of 0.6 m and length of 4 m), the radiation level at the
driver's seat (0.5 m from the end surface of the cylinder)
would be a maximum of approximately 200 mRh-1. 5 cm of lead
shielding between the driver and the waste can reduce this
level to approx. 10 mRh-1.
The radiation level at a distance of 4 m from the side of the
lorry (corresponding to the distance to the closest pedestrian
on the pavement) would be a maximum of 130 mRh-1 when the lorry
is at a standstill. The transit dose to anyone on the pavement
would be, assuming a speed of 40 km.h-1, a maximum of about
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30 yR ~ 30 yrem. If the asphalt is not removed from the roads
until some months after the accident, the radiation levels
would be reduced to about 1/30.
11.3. Conclusions
It would be appropriate to conduct the sewage temporarily around
the purification plants and directly out into the Sound. A
further possibility would be to cast a concrete storage facility
to hold the active sludge (700-1000 m3) which could be placed in
it by means of an excavator. After sealing the container with a
layer of concrete and soil, it would give sufficient shielding
to obviate the necessity of placing any restrictions on the area,
Work in the sewer system, with 4% of the deposited activity re-
tained, could not be carried out as normal. However, it would
be possible to suspend such work for some months. Even assuming
that all the activity concerned (4%) did remain in the sewer
system, the radiation level after some months would be reduced
to approximately 30 mRh-1, originating mainly from 137cs and
134Cs.
The amounts of broken up asphalt could be large - approx. 2-3 m3
per 100 m2 of asphalted road - depending on how closely it is
stacked. The amount of activity here would be a maximum 16 Ci
if the asphalt is broken up immediately after the deposition of
activity, and approx. 0.5 Ci if this takes place after an in-
terval of some months.
In the case of contaminated agricultural products - e.g., field
crops - destruction might be necessary, cf. chapter 10. If field
crops were burnt the activity would be spread by the wind and
lead to contamination elsewhere. One possibility would be to
harvest the crops in the normal manner and then dispose of them.
Another possibility would be to plough them into the soil. The
best time for this would depend on what stage of growth the
crops had reached at the time of the accident.
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Disused gravel pits could be used as repositories for wastes,
these being classified as low and medium active.
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